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THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF UNIFORMITY 
IN FEDERAL SENTENCING 
Michael M. O’Hear* 
Uniformity has become a dominant objective of the federal 
sentencing system, but there is curiously little agreement, or even 
sustained analysis, as to what uniformity really means or how to achieve 
it.  By way of illustrating the confusion, one need look no further than 
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in United States v. Booker, in 
which the Court found unconstitutional the federal sentencing system 
that had been in place since 1987.1  The Court split over the remedy.  
Justice Breyer, writing for a majority, held that the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines, previously binding on judges, should be made 
merely advisory.2  Four dissenters would have retained the mandatory 
character of the guidelines, but required jury fact-finding to implement 
them.3  Breyer rejected jury fact-finding as inconsistent with the 
principle of uniformity in sentencing, which he characterized as 
“Congress’ basic goal” in adopting the guidelines system in the 1980s.4  
The dissenters agreed that uniformity was Congress’ goal, but argued 
that their remedy was actually truer to that intent.5  Indeed, Justice 
Stevens went so far as to assert that “uniformity is eliminated by the 
majority’s remedy.”6  In short, while invoking the same objective of 
uniformity, Breyer and Stevens ultimately reached diametrically 
opposite conclusions as to what that shared objective actually entailed. 
At one level, of course, the meaning of uniformity is clear enough: 
similarly situated defendants should get similar sentences, while 
 
 * Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School.  J.D. Yale Law School, 1996; B.A., 
Yale College, 1991.  Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter.  Thanks to Douglas Berman, Steven 
Chanenson, Jason Czarnezki, Nora Demleitner, Eric Goldman, Wayne Logan, Marc Miller, Daniel 
Richman, and Ronald Wright for comments on an earlier draft. 
I am especially pleased and honored that this Article appears in the University of Cincinnati Law 
Review on the thirty-fifth anniversary of Judge Marvin Frankel’s seminal lecture on federal sentencing at 
the University of Cincinnati College of Law, which laid the groundwork for the sentencing reform 
movement that is my subject.  See Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 
(1972) (reprinting the 1971 lecture).  Judge Frankel’s vision of a more humane and dignified sentencing 
process remains a compelling one, and this Article is dedicated to his memory. 
 1. 543 U.S. 220, 226 (2005). 
 2. Id. at 246. 
 3. Id. at 271–72 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
 4. Id. at 253 
 5. Id. at 299 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 6. Id. (emphasis added). 
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differently situated defendants should get appropriately different 
sentences.7  Put differently, uniformity seeks to eliminate unwarranted 
sentencing disparities, but also to provide for warranted disparities.  The 
problem lies in distinguishing the warranted from the unwarranted.8  
What factors, in other words, will be considered relevant in 
distinguishing among defendants at sentencing?  For instance, does the 
fact that a defendant is a single parent with small children justify a 
different sentence than would be given an otherwise identically situated 
defendant?  How about if the defendant has a drug dependency problem 
or a physical disability?  Should it matter that the defendant pled guilty, 
thereby saving the government the expense of going to trial? 
In order to address such questions in a coherent fashion, we are in 
need of some clearer thinking about the value of uniformity, that is, the 
good we hope to accomplish through the pursuit of more uniform 
sentencing.  This Article examines the question through the lens of 
history.  My central concern is this: in the thinking of prominent 
reformers who played important roles in shaping the federal sentencing 
system, how exactly was uniformity conceptualized and why was it 
viewed as desirable?  This historical analysis will not only illuminate the 
questions raised in Booker regarding congressional intent, but also 
reveal alternative ways of thinking about uniformity that may enrich the 
ongoing debate over the future of federal sentencing. 
The history begins in 1973, with the publication of Judge Marvin 
Frankel’s influential call for the development of sentencing guidelines 
for the federal courts,9 and proceeds through enactment of the so-called 
Feeney Amendment in 2003, which made several important changes to 
the guidelines system.  Other distinguished scholars have told the story 
of federal sentencing reform before,10 but none with my particular point 
of focus: the rise and evolution of what I call the “uniformity ideal” in 
federal sentencing. 
 
 7. The term “uniformity” is sometimes used more narrowly to refer only to treating like cases 
alike; I use the term in the broader sense indicated by Booker.  For further discussion of the semantic 
difficulties, see Michael M. O’Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 249, 249–50 (2005).  
For a contrasting approach to the terminology problems, see Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of 
Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 381–89 (2005). 
 8. See Kevin Cole, The Empty Idea of Sentencing Disparity, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1336, 1336 
(1997) (“[D]isparity is not a self-defining concept.”). 
 9. MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER  (1973). 
 10. See, e.g., KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 9–77 (1998); MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 9–13, 72–79 (1996); 
Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Your Cheatin’ Heart(land): The Long Search for Administrative 
Sentencing Justice, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 723 (1999); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of 
Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 223, 228 (1993). 
2006] UNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 751 
I use the label as a nod to Professor Francis Allen, who so eloquently 
dissected the decline of the “rehabilitative ideal” in the 1970s.11  It is 
appropriate to invoke the rehabilitative ideal for at least three reasons, 
each of which will be elaborated in this Article.  First, when the 
rehabilitative ideal went into decline, it was the uniformity ideal that 
emerged as the new governing principle of the federal sentencing 
system.  Second, the uniformity-enhancing reforms, as originally 
conceived by Frankel and his contemporaries, were intended to 
rationalize and humanize the criminal justice system in much the same 
way that the rehabilitative ideal was originally intended to rationalize 
and humanize.  Third, much as critics argued in the 1970s that 
rehabilitation was an uncertain concept that might be misused as cover 
for irrational and inhumane practices, it is now apparent that uniformity 
is also an elastic principle that may be invoked to camouflage dubious 
policies. 
As the remedy debate in Booker suggests, the uniformity ideal has 
meant quite different things to different people.  Much of the difficulty 
stems from the tension between two distinct approaches to uniformity, 
which I describe as the predictability paradigm and the purposes 
paradigm.  Under the predictability paradigm, defendants should be 
distinguished only in ways that can be anticipated well in advance of 
sentencing, perhaps even in advance of the commission of the crime.  
This paradigm favors simplicity and bright-line rules, and disfavors 
sentencing factors that are relatively subjective in nature, such as intent 
and character.  Under the purposes paradigm, by contrast, sentencing 
factors are deemed relevant or irrelevant based not on their operational 
predictability, but on their contribution to recognized objectives of 
sentencing, such as retribution and deterrence.  Because these objectives 
are many, and their implementation potentially dependent on a variety of 
subjective variables, the purposes paradigm may support a sentencing 
system that is both analytically richer and less transparent than would be 
favored under the predictability paradigm. 
Both paradigms find support in Frankel’s work.  Subsequent 
reformers have typically emphasized one or the other, and the varying 
attempts to strike a balance between the two have exerted an important 
influence over the development of federal sentencing policy.  In general, 
the movement has been toward greater predictability.  The Booker 
remedy, however, reversed the trend.  Thus, one of the most pressing 
questions facing federal sentencing policy now is whether to embrace 
 
 11. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND 
SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981). 
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the purpose-driven model of uniformity that “won” in Booker, even at 
some cost to the predictability values that Congress has favored in recent 
years. 
Yet, the story of the “original intent” of the uniformity ideal—which I 
locate in Frankel and in the various efforts (ultimately successful) to 
translate Frankel’s ideas into federal legislative reform in the 1970s and 
1980s—is incomplete if it covers only predictability and purpose-driven 
sentencing.  There is another crucial theme, albeit one that has faded 
from view in policymaking debates over the past two decades: showing 
respect for the dignity of criminal defendants.  This was a central, but 
now frequently overlooked, concern of Frankel’s.  Indeed, many of the 
scholars who have written about Frankel’s contributions have lost sight 
of this aspect of his vision, characterizing his work simply as a 
“rationalist, good-government proposal.”12  Uniformity, however, was 
originally supposed to be both rationalizing and humanizing.  In 
particular, as we will see, Frankel and many of contemporaries were 
deeply concerned with the way that defendants experienced the criminal 
justice system, with the way that the process could itself function as 
punishment, and with the tendency of the process to undermine 
defendants’ sense of respect for the law.  This not to deny that Frankel 
was a good-government rationalist, but it is to suggest that this rather 
bloodless characterization misses important and emotionally resonant 
strands of his thinking that have much to contribute to the ongoing 
debate over uniformity in federal sentencing. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I describes eight essential 
problems that sentencing reformers have encountered in attempting to 
give content to the uniformity ideal.  Part II traces the genealogy of 
federal sentencing reform from Frankel to Feeney.  This history will 
focus on the widely varying ways that uniformity advocates have 
addressed the eight essential problems.  Part III elaborates on the 
conflict between the predictability and purposes paradigms.  Viewed 
through this lens of this conflict, the path from leading reform proposals 
in the 1970s to the Feeney Amendment was largely a journey from 
purposes to predictability, with Booker now potentially giving new life 
to the purposes approach.  Finally, Part IV describes the dignity agenda 
that originally lay behind the uniformity ideal, the particular threat posed 
to that agenda by unchecked prosecutorial power, and the reinvigoration 
 
 12. TONRY, supra note 10, at 89.  See also Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 542, 548 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998) (“Frankel’s central concern was that 
discretionary actors such as judges and parole officials followed no rhyme or reason beyond their own 
personal instincts. Punishment decisions, more important than much of the other routine business of the 
courts, were deserving of at least a comparable degree of care.”). 
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of the agenda by recent developments. 
I.  EIGHT ESSENTIAL QUESTIONS 
In order to justify and implement the uniformity ideal, reformers have 
grappled with a host of difficult questions.  This Part outlines eight of 
particular importance.  While this list is by no means exhaustive,13 it 
does get at most of the major fault lines in the federal sentencing debate. 
First, why do we care about uniformity?  Uniformity resonates with 
our most basic instincts about the rule of law: of course, the similarly 
situated should be treated the same.  But why exactly ought we adopt 
any particular changes to sentencing law at any particular time in the 
name of uniformity?  What precisely is the problem with the status quo?  
It hardly seems adequate to answer that we have not realized an abstract 
ideal of the rule of law.  In order to justify major reforms, uniformity 
advocates have always sought to identify more concrete harms caused 
by the status quo.  In particular, they have invoked two types of 
interests: (1) the protection of defendants, particularly from the feelings 
of anxiety and degradation aroused by subjecting them to unchecked 
discretionary power; and (2) the protection of society at large, 
particularly from deterrable crime and from a general erosion of 
confidence in the legal system.  As we will see, the general trend has 
been away from defendant protection, and toward crime reduction, as 
uniformity’s preeminent objective. 
Second, what is the role of purposes?  Implementing the uniformity 
ideal requires the development of criteria for determining which 
defendants should be treated the same and which differently.  Many 
leading uniformity advocates have assumed that such criteria would be 
derived from one or more of the traditionally recognized purposes of 
sentencing: deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and just deserts.14  
 
 13. For instance, other important questions relate to the relevance of local circumstances, see 
Michael M. O’Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing: Reflections on the New Early 
Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 357, 360–63 (2004); victim preferences, see Wayne A. 
Logan, Victims, Survivors and the Decisions to Seek and Impose Death, in WOUNDS THAT DO NOT 
BIND: VICTIM-BASED PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEATH PENALTY (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds., 
2005); and third-party effects of the sentence, see Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal 
Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383 (2002). 
 14. For a concise summary of these purposes, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 13–18 (3d ed. 2001).  A deterrence-based punishment seeks to convince the general 
community (and, in some formulations, the offender himself or herself) not to commit (or repeat the 
commission of) the crime for which the offender is being sentenced.  An incapacitation-based 
punishment relies on confinement and supervision in order to prevent future crimes by offenders who 
are believed to represent particularly important recidivism threats.  A rehabilitative sentence will involve 
some form of therapy, treatment, or training to help address the underlying causes of criminal behavior.  
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Some have contemplated a discriminating process, in which a few of the 
traditional purposes would be favored and others downplayed or 
excluded.  Others have contemplated a more inclusive approach, in 
which all of the traditional purposes would be brought to bear and 
balanced against one another.  However, uniformity need not necessarily 
be purpose driven.  An alternative “empirical” approach, which has 
proven quite important in the development of federal sentencing law, 
relies on an analysis of past practices.  Under this approach, the factors 
that serve to distinguish defendants are those that have typically been 
considered important in previous cases. 
Third, what is the role of offender characteristics?  Potentially 
relevant offender characteristics include such factors as criminal history, 
family responsibilities, socioeconomic status, prior good works, and the 
like.  Whether such characteristics count in a uniformity scheme may 
turn on how the purposes question is answered.  If uniformity is 
structured around the purpose of general deterrence, for instance, then 
few, if any, offender characteristics are apt to be considered relevant.15  
Rehabilitation and incapacitation, by contrast, give much greater 
emphasis to the offender’s background and personal circumstances.16 
Fourth, what is the role of real-offense characteristics?  By the time 
of sentencing, the offender will have been formally convicted of one or 
more specific crimes.  In a “charge-offense” system, the crime of 
conviction will play a central role in determining the sentence.  
Legislatures, however, often draft criminal statutes broadly enough to 
encompass real conduct of widely varying severity, while prosecutors 
may manipulate the crime of conviction through their charging and plea-
bargaining decisions.  A uniformity scheme might therefore look to 
“real-offense” characteristics in order to distinguish among defendants 
who have been formally convicted of the same crime.  For instance, a 
real-offense system might require a longer sentence for the bank robber 
who openly brandishes a loaded weapon than for the bank robber who 
merely carries a toy gun in his pocket.  Even assuming the adoption of a 
real-offense system, however, questions remain as to which types of 
real-offense characteristics ought to be considered relevant and how 
much weight they ought to be given relative to other sentencing factors.  
As we will see, federal policymakers have chosen to give an unusually 
 
Just deserts, a form of retributive punishment, is often contrasted with the foregoing utilitarian purposes 
of punishment; desert does not seek future crime prevention per se, but rather demands punishment as a 
moral imperative in its own right, often seen as necessary to affirm the status of victims or show respect 
for the personhood of defendants. 
 15. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1987). 
 16. Id. 
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heavy weight to real-offense characteristics, particularly those related to 
the amount of harm caused or threatened by the offender’s conduct. 
Fifth, to what extent will uniformity be implemented through rules?  
Students of law are familiar with a distinction between “rules” and 
“standards.”17  In a rules-based regime, outcomes will be strictly 
determined by the presence or absence of a discrete set of objective 
factors, without any formal role for judicial discretion or value 
judgments.  Rules will inevitably be over-inclusive and under-inclusive 
because they do not tie sentencing outcomes directly to the underlying 
values we really care about, and because their authors cannot possibly 
anticipate and address all of the potentially relevant variation in the real 
world.  A standards-based regime, by contrast, will require judges to 
render normative judgments in light of whatever purpose or purposes are 
embodied in the uniformity scheme.  Standards thus appear less crude 
and mechanical than rules, but may operate with less predictability. 
Sixth, how will uniformity affect severity?  Uniformity contemplates 
the elimination of outlier sentences, that is, sentences that are either too 
high or too low relative to some “correct” sentence for a particular 
category of cases.  But what is the correct sentence?  Under a strict 
empirical approach, the right sentence would, in some sense, be the 
average sentence.  Purpose-driven approaches, particularly of the 
inclusive variety, offer less clarity.  In structuring uniformity, then, 
general presumptions about sentence length and the appropriateness of 
incarceration may play an important role.  In light of such presumptions, 
uniformity might adopt a general preference for “leveling up” (i.e., a 
focus on reducing the number and degree of relatively low sentences) or 
“leveling down” (i.e., a focus on reducing the number and degree of 
relatively high sentences), or attempt to find a position of severity-
neutrality (i.e., target high and low sentences equally).  Such preferences 
might be pursued on an across-the-board basis, or might vary by the type 
of offense or offender.  For instance, we might adopt a leveling-down 
approach for first-time offenders, and a leveling-up approach for 
recidivists.  As we will see, federal sentencing policy has increasingly 
pursued a broad leveling-up agenda. 
Seventh, does uniformity encompass prosecutorial decisions?  
Uniformity advocates have typically focused on disparity in judicial 
decisionmaking.  Yet, there is no reason to believe that prosecutors are 
inherently any more rational or consistent in their decisions than judges.  
These prosecutorial decisions include three of particular importance: (1) 
 
 17. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1687–88 (1976). 
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whether to pursue or decline federal criminal charges; (2) which charges 
to bring; and (3) what concessions, if any, to make in the course of plea-
bargaining.  Recognizing the risk of prosecutor-created disparity at these 
points in the process, a uniformity scheme might seek to regulate, or 
correct for, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  For instance, 
prosecutors might be made subject to binding charging and plea-
bargaining guidelines.  Alternatively, uniformity might take prosecutorial 
decisions as a given; in effect, uniformity would be defined as the like 
treatment of defendants who have been prosecuted in a like manner. 
Eighth, what is the role of the defendant’s cooperation?  During 
investigation and prosecution, a defendant may be more or less 
cooperative with law enforcement and court personnel.  At a minimum, 
we would hope that the defendant would refrain from obstruction of 
justice or flight from custody.  But a defendant may do much more: 
enter a timely plea of guilty, saving the government the expense of 
preparing for trial; provide assistance in the investigation or prosecution 
of other offenders; or voluntarily remediate harm caused by the 
offense.18  In practice, defendants vary widely in the scope and value of 
their cooperation.  Such variations might or might not be considered an 
appropriate basis on which to distinguish among otherwise similarly 
situated offenders.  As we will see, despite much criticism (and 
uncertain theoretical grounding), federal sentencing law has given great 
weight to cooperation.19 
II.  UNIFORMITY: FROM FRANKEL TO FEENEY 
This Part traces the genealogy of the pre-Booker federal sentencing 
system, with special attention to the eight questions outlined above.  
Major sentencing reform proposals of the 1970s are covered, along with 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA), the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines adopted pursuant to the SRA in 1987, and the modifications 
to the guidelines regime contained in the 2003 Feeney Amendment.  
First, though, in order to understand the context in which the uniformity 
 
 18. I use a broad definition of cooperation, encompassing any behavior that would be regarded as 
socially desirable by law enforcement and court personnel.  See Michael M. O’Hear, Remorse, 
Cooperation, and “Acceptance of Responsibility,” 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1507, 1511 (1997).  “Cooperation” 
is sometimes used more narrowly to refer to providing assistance in the apprehension and prosecution of 
another offender.  See, e.g., Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and 
Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 23–26 (2003). 
 19. For a discussion of the tension between cooperation benefits and the traditional purposes, see 
Simons, supra note 18, at 23–26.  Professor Simons argues that at least some types of cooperation have 
underappreciated value as forms of retribution or atonement, and that these attributes of cooperation 
help to justify cooperation benefits within traditional punishment paradigms.  Id. at 4–5. 
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advocates of the 1970s operated, we must consider the decline of the so-
called “rehabilitative ideal.” 
A.  Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal 
The rehabilitative ideal functioned as the central organizing principle 
of American sentencing systems for much of the twentieth century.20  
Professor Allen defined this ideal as “the notion that a primary purpose 
of penal treatment is to effect changes in the characters, attitudes, and 
behavior of convicted offenders, so as to strengthen the social defense 
against unwanted behavior, but also to contribute to the welfare and 
satisfaction of offenders.”21  In order to effectuate these purposes, 
federal sentencing law embraced probation, parole, and the 
indeterminate sentence.22  In this system, when a judge imposes a 
sentence of imprisonment, the amount of time actually served is 
determined by a parole board, which is supposed to assess the offender’s 
progress towards rehabilitation.23  The judge-imposed sentence, 
however, sets parameters: in general, prisoners must serve at least one-
third, but no more than two-thirds, of their sentences before release.24 
The rehabilitative ideal suffered a “stunning” crash in prominence in 
the 1970s,25 perhaps most notably among the liberals, academics, and 
criminal justice professionals who had been its most reliable defenders.26  
Allen identified three “principal propositions” on which the critique of 
the rehabilitative ideal rested.27  First, there was the “nothing works” 
proposition: “there is no evidence that an effective rehabilitative 
technique exists . . . we do not know how to prevent criminal recidivism 
through rehabilitative effort.”28  Second, the rehabilitative ideal was 
 
 20. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 6.  See, e.g., Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) 
(“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law.  Reformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”). 
 21. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 2. 
 22. Id. at 6. 
 23. Reitz, supra note 12, at 543. 
 24. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 20. 
 25. Reitz, supra note 12, at 544. 
 26. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 7, 9–10.  Illustrating the loss of support from the left, the American 
Friends Service Committee issued a highly influential attack on the rehabilitative ideal in 1971.  Id. at 7.  
See G. RICHARD BACON ET AL., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (1971). 
 27. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 33. 
 28. Id. at 57.  See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 170 (1975) (“[T]here is little 
or no evidence that available correctional systems will produce much rehabilitation”); BACON ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 9 (“There is neither consensus among the experts nor validation by research of any 
categories of diagnosis for criminal behavior.”).  The “nothing works” catchphrase was derived from an 
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inconsistent with “the political values of free societies.”29  
Rehabilitation, of course, purported to be apolitical: this was a medical 
model of crime that did not, on its face, implicate the distribution of 
wealth or power in society.30  However, criminal justice responses to the 
civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s cast doubt on the claims 
of political neutrality.31  This experience, in turn, strengthened a basic 
“liberal unease” with rehabilitation: “efforts to influence by coercive 
means the very thoughts, feelings, and aspirations of offenders threaten 
trespass by the state upon areas of dignity and choice posited as immune 
by the liberal creed.”32 
Finally, “the rehabilitative ideal has revealed itself in practice to be 
peculiarly vulnerable to debasement and the serving of unintended and 
unexpressed social ends.”33  “Central among the causes of debasement is 
the conceptual weakness of the rehabilitative ideal.”34  Ambiguity 
surrounds not only the means of achieving rehabilitation, but also “the 
very notion of what rehabilitation consists.”35  In light of this ambiguity, 
it was not difficult for officials to camouflage self-interested policies or 
crude corporal punishment as “therapeutic.”36 
Whatever the merits of this critique, the decline of the rehabilitative 
ideal created something of an ideology vacuum.  At a time when the 
public increasingly demanded reform to address rising crime rates, what 
principle would help legislators restructure the sentencing system?  
Uniformity emerged as the answer.37 
 
oversimplified reading of an influential empirical survey by Robert Martinson.  See Reitz, supra note 12, 
at 544 (discussing Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 
PUB. INT. 22 (1974)). 
 29. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 34. 
 30. Id. at 35. 
 31. Id. at 36. 
 32. Id. at 44–45.  See also NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 26 (1974) (arguing 
that coerced rehabilitation should be rejected based on “historical evidence about the misuse of power 
and from more fundamental views of the nature of man and his rights to freedom”); BACON ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 40 (associating rehabilitative ideal with “steady expansion of the scope of the criminal 
justice system and a consolidation of the state’s absolute power over the lives of those caught in the 
net”). 
 33. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 34. 
 34. Id. at 51. 
 35. Id. at 52. 
 36. Id. at 53–54.  See also MORRIS, supra note 32, at 13 (arguing that rehabilitative programs 
“have been corrupted to punitive purposes”); BACON ET AL., supra note 26, at 39–40 (“The authority 
given those who manage the system . . . has concealed the practices carried on in the name of the 
treatment model.”). 
 37. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 15, at 8 (“In many respects, uniformity has become a goal in 
and of itself, apart from satisfying the purposes of sentencing.”).  Others have taken the view that 
retribution, or just deserts, replaced rehabilitation as the “governing rationale for sentencing policy.”  
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B.  Frankel’s Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 
The late Marvin Frankel provided much of the impetus for federal 
sentencing reform with the publication of his classic Criminal 
Sentences: Law Without Order in 1973.38  The book grew out of 
Frankel’s experiences as a federal district court judge in the era of 
indeterminate sentencing.  Frankel and his colleagues on the bench had 
the authority to determine sentences within broad ranges, typically 
extending from probation up to a high statutory maximum term of 
imprisonment, with essentially no appellate review.39  Frankel decried 
the “horrible” sentencing disparities resulting from this regime.40 
In order to address the disparity problem, Frankel urged Congress to 
resolve once and for all the important policy problems of sentencing, 
such as whether retributive objectives ought to be considered and 
whether sentences should be reduced on the basis of cooperation.41  He 
also urged the adoption of “a kind of detailed profile or checklist of 
factors that would include, wherever possible, some form of numerical 
or other objective grading.”42  These “sentencing guidelines” (to use a 
label later applied to Frankel’s proposal) would be developed by an 
expert commission and then consulted by judges during the sentencing 
process.43  As we will see, commission-drafted guidelines became a 
central feature of subsequent reform proposals, although different 
reformers have had very different ideas about the nature of the 
 
TONRY, supra note 10, at 13.  See also Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of 
Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315 
(2000) (describing efforts of state courts and legislatures “to repudiate utilitarian purposes and 
interpolate retributive ones” into nominally utilitarian sentencing systems).  While retributive 
approaches may occupy a position of particular strength in the academy, see Russell L. Christopher, 
Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 846–47 (2002), it 
is less clear that these approaches have attained a dominant status elsewhere.  Federal sentencing law, in 
particular, may be better characterized as consequentialist than retributive, specifically favoring 
incapacitation and deterrence.  Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 415–16 
(2002).  But cf. infra note 260 (discussing debate among scholars as to whether federal guidelines 
embody “modified just deserts” approach).  Indeed, as we will see, neither Congress nor the Sentencing 
Commission has expressly endorsed retribution as the exclusive, or even the primary, purpose of the 
sentencing guidelines.  What both Congress and the Commission have expressly endorsed—repeatedly 
and unequivocally—is the objective of uniformity. 
 38. Stith & Koh, supra note 10, at 228. 
 39. Id. at 225–27. 
 40. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 21.  Later researchers, however, have demonstrated that pre-
guidelines studies of disparity were methodologically flawed and that claims of widespread racial 
discrimination in sentencing, in particular, had little empirical support.  STITH & CABRANES, supra note 
10, at 106–12. 
 41. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 107, 112–13. 
 42. Id. at 114. 
 43. Id. at 118. 
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guidelines. 
Frankel’s uniformity scheme, it is important to note, was motivated 
by a concern for defendants.  To be sure, Frankel often spoke in abstract 
terms of “the rule of law,” or a “government of laws, not of men,” as his 
objective.44  But whenever Frankel moved from this highest level of 
generality, it became clear that he saw defendants as the real victims of 
disparity.  The harm suffered by defendants had at least four dimensions.  
First, Frankel argued, it was an affront to the dignity of defendants to 
subject them to potentially arbitrary or malicious exercises of power.  
“There is dignity and security,” he wrote, “in the assurance that each of 
us—plain or beautiful, rich or poor, black, white, tall, curly, whatever—
is promised treatment as a bland, fungible ‘equal’ before the law.”45  No 
such assurance was available, however, in a world of vast, unguided 
judicial discretion at sentencing. 
Second, Frankel saw a problem of fair notice: 
[I]n the great majority of federal criminal cases a defendant who comes 
up for sentencing has no way of knowing or reliably predicting whether 
he will walk out of the courtroom on probation, or be locked up for a term 
of years that may consume the rest of his life, or something in between.46 
This lack of predictability caused defendants to experience unnecessary 
anxiety and anger,47 and impaired their ability to make well-informed 
decisions about their conduct.48 
Third, Frankel believed that unjustified disparities fostered a sense of 
resentment by prisoners against the legal system: 
The absence of any explanation or purported justification for the sentence 
is among the more familiar and understandable sources of bitterness 
among people in prison.  Philosophers have agreed for ages on the ideal 
that the person suffering punishment should be guided to understand and, 
in the ultimate hope, realize the justice of the affliction. . . . The splatter 
of varied sentences, with the unexplained variations left to be seen as 
random or worse, nourishes the view that there is no justice in the law.49 
This sense of resentment might impair the rehabilitation of prisoners50 
and otherwise interfere with the effective management of prisons.51 
 
 44. See, e.g., id. at 5, 3. 
 45. Id. at 11. 
 46. Id. at 6. 
 47. Id. at 96–97. 
 48. Id. at 5, 10, 19. 
 49. Id. at 42–44. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 17 (quoting prison official who characterized prison strike as response to harsh 
sentencing practices of one particular judge). 
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Fourth, Frankel believed that disparity harmed defendants by 
resulting in unduly harsh sentences.  “My basic premises about 
sentencing,” he wrote, “include a firm conviction that we in this country 
send far too many people to prison for terms that are far too long.”52  It 
is clear, based on the many anecdotes he related, that his mental image 
of disparity was of judges handing out unduly long sentences on the 
basis of factors that—in Frankel’s view—should receive little or no 
weight.  Consider, for instance, one anecdote that, in Frankel’s own 
words, “epitomizes” his reasons for writing the book: 
Judge X . . . told [Frankel] of a defendant for whom the judge . . . had 
decided tentatively upon a sentence of four years’ imprisonment.  At the 
sentencing hearing in the courtroom, after hearing counsel, Judge X 
invited the defendant to exercise his right to address the court in his own 
behalf.  The defendant took a sheaf of papers from his pocket and 
proceeded to read from them, excoriating the judge, the “kangaroo court” 
in which he’d been tried, and the legal establishment in general.  
Completing the story, Judge X said [to Frankel], “I listened without 
interrupting.  Finally, when he said he was through, I simply gave the son 
of a bitch five years instead of the four.” . . . [T]hink about it. . . . a year in 
prison for speaking disrespectfully to a judge.53 
In such anecdotes, Frankel does little to hide his contempt for judges 
who would increase sentences on the basis of whim or bias,54 but 
Frankel relates no comparable stories of arbitrary lenience. 
Underscoring this view—that the uniformity ideal was intended to be 
protective of defendants—Frankel drew explicit parallels between his 
reform proposal and the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in 
Furman v. Georgia,55 which temporarily outlawed capital punishment.  
Noting the Court’s criticism of American capital sentencing as 
“wanton,” “freakish,” and a “lottery,” Frankel argued that similar labels 
might be affixed to noncapital sentencing, possibly raising similarly 
weighty constitutional objections.56 
Frankel was not the first author to rail against sentencing disparities.  
For instance, uniformity had been a central plank in the platform of the 
great eighteenth-century Italian reformer Cesare Beccaria.57  Closer to 
 
 52. Id. at 58. 
 53. Id. at 18. 
 54. See, e.g., id. at 17 (“The books and the reliable folklore are filled with . . . horror stories—of 
fierce sentences and orgies of denunciatory attacks upon defendants.”). 
 55. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 56. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 103–04. 
 57. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 57–59 (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-
Merrill 1963) (1764). 
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Frankel’s time, the influential administrative law scholar Kenneth Culp 
Davis had recently proposed that judicial sentencing discretion be 
curtailed through the adoption of guidelines.58  Various other measures 
to address disparity had also been proposed or tested by 1973.59  Indeed, 
Frankel’s critique of judicial discretion echoed much of the broader 
critique of the rehabilitative ideal: too much power was being given to 
officials in the criminal justice system who did not really know what 
they were doing, and who were prone to use their power in ways that 
were arbitrary and cruel. 
Frankel’s significance stems not from the content of these sorts of 
claims, but from three other sources.  First, in a manner reminiscent of 
Beccaria, Frankel melded the anger and eloquence of radical 
criminology with a liberal, rationalist sensibility, embodying an implicit 
faith in the ability of representative legislatures and well-informed 
experts to ameliorate the social problems of crime and punishment.60  
Second, as a judge himself, Frankel offered a compelling insider’s 
perspective, peppered with anecdotes and bearing something of “true-
life confessions” quality.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, Frankel 
wedded the concept of sentencing guidelines for the first time to the 
concept of the expert agency.  His guidelines would be drafted by a 
sentencing commission, which he envisioned as a quasi-scholarly body 
that would conduct research and develop guidelines through a process of 
ongoing study and experimentation.61 
If Frankel was vague on a great many points, leaving issues like the 
purposes of punishment to be resolved by the legislature, this tendency 
may have also contributed to his influence.  By avoiding or downplaying 
controversial issues, Frankel could couch his uniformity proposal as an 
apolitical reform.  At a time when the apolitical pretensions of the 
rehabilitative ideal were under assault, the promise of a more neutral 
organizing principle for the criminal justice system must have held great 
 
 58. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 133–41 (1969). 
 59. Mechanisms in use by the date of Frankel’s book included sentencing institutes, which 
provided a forum for judges to discuss sentencing standards and criteria, and sentencing councils, 
through which judges could obtain the views of colleagues on particular cases.  Id. at 134–35. 
 60. For a concise description of radical criminology and its critique of the indeterminate, 
rehabilitative system, see Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court 
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1234–38 (1998).  For instance, the AFSC Report, reflecting the 
radical perspective, argued that the concepts of “crime” and “justice” were defined and enforced for the 
benefit of socioeconomic elites.  BACON ET AL., supra note 26, at 10–11, 16.  While Frankel certainly 
felt that white middle-class defendants benefited from judicial discretion, he suggested no such 
systematic “conspiracy theory” and essentially accepted the legitimacy (if not necessarily the wisdom) 
of legislative definitions of crime. 
 61. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 118–20. 
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appeal. 
Indeed, it is striking how close in spirit Frankel’s writing was to the 
nominally apolitical, mid-century rehabilitative ideal: the criminal 
punishment system would be administered by neutral experts (now a 
sentencing commission, instead of therapists and parole boards), with an 
eye to improving the attitude and satisfaction of offenders and 
facilitating their successful reintegration into society.62  In essence, 
Frankel’s version of the uniformity ideal was intended to do the same 
things as the rehabilitative ideal, but it was expected to achieve more 
success because it would avoid the anxiety- and resentment-inducing 
uncertainties and abuses of the indeterminate sentencing system. 
C.  Yale Workshop: The Pursuit of Purposeful Sentences 
In an effort to develop a more detailed reform proposal, the Yale Law 
School sponsored an important workshop for criminal justice 
policymakers and practitioners in 1974 and 1975.63  Workshop 
participants, including Frankel himself, met monthly to discuss 
sentencing and related topics.64  The results of their deliberations, 
including specific legislative language, were published in book form in 
1977 under the title Toward a Just and Effective Sentencing System: 
Agenda for Legislative Reform.  Workshop participants had the ear of 
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, and an early draft of the 
workshop’s report became the basis for a sentencing reform bill 
introduced by Kennedy in 1975.65 
The Yale group characterized the disparity problem much as Frankel 
did.  The group shared his view that disparity created a “perception by 
inmates . . . that their sentences have been imposed in a random and 
unjust way, under a tyrannical system sanctioned by law.”66  This 
 
 62. For an eloquent and influential exposition of the rehabilitative ideal along these lines, see 
KARL MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).  Menninger’s agenda, like Frankel’s, was 
distinctly humanizing, see, e.g., id. at 10 (“The more fiercely, the more ruthlessly, the more inhumanely 
the offender is treated . . . the more certain we are to have more victims.”), and rationalizing, see, e.g., 
id. at 17 (criticizing failure of criminal justice system to make use of insights of behavioral science). 
 63. See TONRY, supra note 10, at 12 (characterizing first sentencing commission legislation 
introduced in Congress as a “direct outgrowth” of Yale workshop); PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., 
TOWARD A JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM xi–xii 
(1977) (describing purposes and organization of Yale workshop). 
 64. Other participants included District Court (and later Second Circuit) Judge Jon O. Newman; 
Department of Justice official (and later Sentencing Commission member) Ron Gainor; Yale professors 
Dennis Curtis, Daniel Freed, Barbara Underwood, and Stanton Wheeler; and several high-ranking 
federal prison and parole officials.  O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 63, at xii. 
 65. Id. at 88. 
 66. Id. at 10. 
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perception, in turn, impaired effective prison administration and 
offender rehabilitation.67  The Yale group also shared Frankel’s belief 
that sentencing disparity was in tension with the constitutional guarantee 
of equal protection.68  However, the Yale Report also explicitly 
characterized sentencing disparity as a threat to public respect for the 
law,69 marking a subtle shift from Frankel’s concern for the satisfaction 
of criminal defendants to a concern for public satisfaction more 
generally.  Later reformers emphasized and elaborated on this theme. 
Like Frankel, the Yale group recognized the need for a uniformity 
scheme to address purposes of punishment.  The Yale report endorsed 
four such purposes (deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and 
denunciation)70 and contemplated that the sentencing judge in each case 
would determine an appropriate sentence to achieve each purpose.  The 
sentence actually imposed would be the longest of the four purpose-
specific sentences.71  However, the proposal also specifically prohibited 
sentences that were disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.72 
The Yale group contemplated that offender characteristics, such as the 
offender’s mental and physical condition, would play an important role 
in the implementation of this purpose-driven approach to sentencing.73  
Indeed, the group went out of its way to condemn mandatory minimum 
sentences that prohibited consideration of individual offender 
characteristics.74  On the other hand, the group had reservations about 
real-offense sentencing.  In particular, the Yale report decried the 
practice of sentencing on the basis of crimes that were alleged in a 
presentence report, but not formally charged and prosecuted.75 
The Yale group was also skeptical of routine imprisonment: “The 
foundation of the proposed system,” the report declared, “is a 
presumption against incarceration.”76  In general, the group would have 
limited incarceration to cases in which deterrence or incapacitation was 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 33. 
 69. Id. at 38, 58. 
 70. Id. at 107. 
 71. Id. at 52. 
 72. Id. at 53.  The drafters seem chiefly to have had in mind a safeguard to prevent property 
crimes from being treated more severely than serious violent crimes.  Id. at 53–54.  In any event, the 
gravity-based cap reflects the concept of “limiting retributivism” that is particularly associated with the 
late Norval Morris.  See MORRIS, supra note 32, at 73; ALLEN, supra note 11, at 72. 
 73. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 63, at 108. 
 74. Id. at 16, 34. 
 75. Id. at 46. 
 76. Id. at 35. 
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an overriding concern.77  The proposal was thus expected to reduce 
prison populations.78 
Finally, the Yale group would have implemented uniformity through 
broadly defined standards: What sentence is necessary for deterrence? 
For rehabilitation?  For incapacitation?  While the Yale group 
contemplated the development of sentencing guidelines by a 
commission, these guidelines were not to be binding, but, rather, merely 
a matter for the court’s consideration in light of the overriding goal of 
furthering the authorized purposes of sentencing. 
In retrospect, the Yale group’s proposal makes for a fascinating “road 
not taken” in federal sentencing reform.  The group sought, above all, to 
force judges to consider purposes in a systematic fashion; the model of 
uniformity is one in which defendants are differentiated, not on the basis 
of rules, but on the basis of a structured, deliberative process relating 
sentences to broad public policy considerations on a case-by-case basis.  
Among other things, this model reflects considerable confidence in the 
capabilities of the judiciary, which was not altogether consistent with 
Frankel’s personal views.  The model also seems in tension with 
Frankel’s emphasis on predictability, for it seems unlikely that one could 
anticipate in advance the outcome of such a broad analysis of purposes 
and offender characteristics.  While the Yale group shared Frankel’s 
leveling-down instincts and desire for a more open, rational, and self-
conscious sentencing process, other reformers would build on Frankel’s 
skepticism of judges and his call for predictability. 
D.  TCF Task Force: Deterrence and Predictability 
Concurrent with the deliberations of the Yale workshop, the 
Twentieth Century Fund (TCF) assembled its own blue-ribbon Task 
Force on Criminal Sentencing.79  The Task Force’s report, which was 
authored by Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School, reached 
quite different conclusions than that of the Yale group.80  For instance, 
in explaining why disparity was a matter of concern, the Task Force 
much more clearly emphasized crime control.81  The report asserted: 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 38. 
 79. TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN 
PUNISHMENT vii (1976) [hereinafter TCF REPORT]. 
 80. Other members of the Task Force included former Governor of California Edmund G. 
Brown, Sr.; the noted criminal law theorist Andrew von Hirsch; Stanford Law Professor Barbara 
Babcock; and several judges and law enforcement officials.  Id. at ix. 
 81. See, e.g., id. at 3 (defining the report’s “intended objective” as “reform in the system of 
criminal justice that can ultimately lead to a lower crime rate”). 
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[U]nless these unfair disparities are drastically reduced, our criminal 
justice system will suffer increasing losses of respect and credibility 
among every segment of our society . . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . Where equal treatment is not the rule, potential offenders are 
encouraged to play the odds, believing that they too will be among the 
large group that escapes serious sanction.  Hence, the ineffectiveness of 
today’s sentencing system in conveying the message that violations of the 
criminal law will be punished, thus weakening the deterrent value in 
prison sentences.82 
While acknowledging the “keenly felt” sense of injustice among 
prisoners arising from perceived disparities,83 the Task Force did not 
dwell on this concern to the same extent as Frankel and the Yale 
group.84  Rather, the Task Force focused its attention on “continual 
dilution of the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system.”85  Thus, in 
sharp contrast to Frankel, the Task Force offered plenty of data and 
anecdotes purporting to demonstrate that sentences were often too 
short.86 
With its emphasis on deterrence and desert, and comparatively less 
interest in rehabilitation and incapacitation, the Task Force offered little 
room in its proposal for the consideration of offender characteristics.  
More specifically, the Task Force’s proposed scheme of “presumptive 
sentencing” required the legislature (or a sentencing commission) to 
determine a precise sentence for each “subcategory” of crime.87  Each 
subcategory would represent the commission of a particular crime in a 
particular manner.88  The presumptive sentence would be increased 
according to a predetermined formula based on prior convictions.89  The 
sentence could also be increased or decreased by up to fifty percent if 
the number of aggravating circumstances in the case substantially 
exceeded the number of mitigating circumstances, or vice versa.90  By 
way of illustration, the Task Force identified twenty aggravating and 
 
 82. Id. at 4, 6–7. 
 83. Id. at 6. 
 84. For instance, the Task Force provided no discussion of the effect of disparities on prison 
management and offender rehabilitation. 
 85. Id. at 34. 
 86. See id. at 4–5. 
 87. Id. at 20. 
 88. For instance, the Task Force contemplated five distinct subcategories of burglary, from 
burglary of a dwelling when the occupants were home and involving the brandishing of a weapon (with 
a presumptive sentence of twenty-four months) to burglary of a clearly abandoned dwelling (with a 
presumptive sentence of probation).  Id. at 56–57. 
 89. Id. at 20. 
 90. Id. at 46. 
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mitigating circumstances for armed robbery, all of which relate to the 
circumstances of the crime, the degree of harm risked or caused, and the 
defendant’s culpability, motive, or role in the offense.91  In short, the 
Task Force contemplated that, aside from criminal history, the 
determination of both the presumptive sentence and the availability of 
some variation from the presumptive sentence would be governed, not 
by offender characteristics, but by offense characteristics, and that these 
characteristics would include real-offense factors. 
With respect to severity, the Task Force also took a different position 
than Frankel or the Yale group.  As noted above, the Task Force 
expressed equal concern with overly lenient as with overly harsh 
sentences.92  And, in order to enhance the deterrent value of criminal 
law, the Task Force urged that “a larger number of criminals who have 
committed serious offenses should serve time in confinement.”93  On the 
other hand, the Task Force also argued that the length of time served by 
inmates should, in general, be reduced.94  Put differently, the Task Force 
contemplated a greater number, but a shorter average length, of prison 
terms.  Thus, the Task Force expected “no significant effect on the size 
of prison populations.”95 
The Task Force also parted company with the Yale group on the 
question of rules versus standards: 
[S]entencing policies should be expressed in considerable detail.  We 
favor explicit presumptive sentences for various offenses.  And we 
believe that the factors that make a particular offense more or less serious 
for sentencing purposes should be clearly set out. 
 . . . [W]e are disagreeing with the trend in recent “model” sentencing 
statutes—a trend that eschews detail and favors general principles.96 
The Task Force’s preference for rules over standards may be clearest in 
its sympathy for mandatory minimums and “flat-time” schemes, i.e., 
strictly predetermined sentences for each crime.  The Task Force found 
“many virtues” in such systems, but ultimately rejected them because of 
statutory overbreadth in the definition of some crimes.97 
Because of its desire for such a dramatic decrease in judicial 
discretion, the Task Force was forced to grapple with the problem of 
prosecutorial discretion, particularly the prospect that prosecutors would 
 
 91. Id. at 44–45. 
 92. Id. at 4. 
 93. Id. at 31. 
 94. Id. at 32. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 25. 
 97. Id. at 17. 
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undermine uniformity through their charging and plea-bargaining 
practices.98  For instance, the Task Force was troubled by the question of 
how to sentence “a defendant simultaneously charged with several 
offenses that grew out of the same or a connected transaction or are 
closely related in time.”99  Rather than attribute too much weight to the 
prosecutor’s charging decisions in such cases, the Task Force concluded, 
“The best solution would probably be to devise a sophisticated system in 
which every additional crime in a series carried an increment of 
punishment but not the full increment of a consecutive sentence.”100  
Likewise, the Task Force anticipated that the prosecutor’s discretionary 
power would be curtailed by discontinuing the practice of reducing 
sentences based on the prosecutor’s recommendation of lenience or the 
defendant’s entry of a guilty plea.101 
Like the Yale proposal, the Task Force’s model of reform represents 
an intriguing “road not taken.”  With a rules-based system focusing on a 
limited number of sentencing factors, the Task Force offered a 
predictability that sharply differentiates its approach from that of the 
Yale group.  In its emphasis on predictability, as well as its skepticism 
of judicial discretion, the Task Force echoed important themes of 
Frankel.  On the other hand, the Task Force’s preoccupation with crime 
control and its amenability to routine incarceration did not reflect 
Frankel’s views, but did foreshadow the future direction in which the 
uniformity ideal would evolve. 
E.  Early Kennedy Bills: Deterrence and Discretion 
The contrasts between the reports of the Yale group and the TCF Task 
Force (rules versus standards; bias for or against incarceration; weight 
given to rehabilitative purposes and offender characteristics; emphasis 
on crime control versus defendant rights; amenability to real-offense 
sentencing; and attentiveness to the prosecutor as a potential source of 
disparity) have largely set the parameters for the debate over uniformity 
and sentencing guidelines ever since.  The remainder of this Part focuses 
on how the debate has played out in the federal lawmaking arena.102 
 
 98. Id. at 26. 
 99. Id. at 27. 
 100. Id. at 27–28. 
 101. Id. at 26. 
 102. I have focused on the proposals of the Yale group and the TCF Task Force as precursors to 
federal sentencing reform because of the prominence of their authors, the connections of the groups to 
Frankel and Kennedy, and the stark contrasts in their approaches.  However, a number of other 
noteworthy sentencing reform proposals were advanced in the 1970s in order to address the disparity 
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In tracing the movement of uniformity from the realm of blue-ribbon 
working groups to the legislature, the key figure is undoubtedly Senator 
Edward Kennedy.  Kennedy was an enthusiastic supporter of the Yale 
group and wrote a glowing foreword to the published Yale report.103  In 
fact, an early draft of the Yale report formed the basis of a sentencing 
reform bill introduced by Kennedy in 1975.104  Kennedy also had 
connections to the TCF Task Force through Dershowitz, with whom he 
consulted on the development of later reform bills.105 
Kennedy introduced another sentencing commission bill (S. 181) in 
early 1977, followed shortly by a broader criminal law reform measure 
(S. 1437), which included substantially all of S. 181.106  The Senate 
ultimately passed S. 1437 in 1978.107  While the House proved 
unreceptive to sentencing reform at first, Kennedy’s persistent efforts 
paid off in 1984 with passage of the SRA, a law that incorporated many 
crucial features of the early Kennedy bills.108  In short, the 1975 and 
1977 bills constitute a direct link between the pre-legislative ferment of 
the early and mid-1970s and the guidelines system that was finally 
adopted.  Yet, Kennedy’s version of the uniformity ideal in these bills 
was different in important respects both from what preceded and what 
followed. 
In language very similar to that of the TCF Task Force, Kennedy 
presented uniformity as a crime control measure: 
The impact of sentencing disparity on our criminal justice system and, 
therefore, on the effectiveness of the national effort against crime, is real 
and immediate.  An important prerequisite in any crime-fighting 
program—certainty of punishment—is absent.  The criminal justice 
 
problem.  See, e.g., NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIM. JUSTICE STDS. AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 
146–47, 177–79 (1973).  Additionally, federal sentencing reform was also fueled by empirical studies 
that purported to demonstrate the existence of widespread sentencing disparity.  STITH & CABRANES, 
supra note 10, at 106–07.  Stith and Cabranes, however, have identified several important deficiencies in 
these studies.  Id. at 107–12.  In any event, despite their historical significance, the early empirical 
studies did not systematically address the normative questions that are of particular concern in this 
Article: why do we care about uniformity, and how should the uniformity ideal be implemented?  For 
instance, the so-called Second Circuit study involved a survey in which judges were asked to impose 
hypothetical sentences based on a given set of facts.  Id. at 108.  While such a study may or may not be 
an appropriate method of determining variations in judicial attitudes towards sentencing, it will not tell 
us which factors ought to be considered relevant. 
 103. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Foreword to PIERCE O’DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND 
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM vii, x (1977). 
 104. Id. at ix. 
 105. Stith & Koh, supra note 10, at 232–33. 
 106. Id. at 233. 
 107. Id. at 234. 
 108. For a complete list of these features, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 40. 
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system is seen as a game of chance in which the potential offender may 
“play the odds” and gamble on receiving a lenient term of imprisonment 
or, indeed, no jail sentence at all.  Disparity, therefore, undercuts the 
entire concept of sentencing as an effective deterrent or punishment. 
. . . Our current sentencing practices nurture an already growing public 
cynicism about our own institutions, a cynicism which inhibits corrective 
action and stimulates disrespect for law.109 
In S. 181,110 Kennedy identified three appropriate purposes of 
punishment: deterrence, incapacitation, and desert.111  Kennedy’s 
treatment of purposes contrasts in some notable ways with that of the 
Yale group.  First, Kennedy dropped rehabilitation, of which he was 
avowedly skeptical,112 from the list of approved purposes.  Second, 
Kennedy envisioned desert as a full-fledged purpose on par with the 
other purposes, whereas the Yale group had conceived of desert only as 
a limitation on the maximum sentence that might be imposed.  Third, 
Kennedy did not suggest any particular method for addressing the 
inevitable tensions between different purposes.  While the Yale group 
indicated that the purpose producing the longest sentence should control, 
Kennedy left the matter open.113  Sentencing judges were simply 
required to consider all of the purposes (as they were also required to 
consider new sentencing guidelines that would be drafted by a 
commission).  Resolving conflicts between these various considerations 
was up to judges on a case-by-case basis. 
Kennedy contemplated that this analytical process would involve 
consideration of offender characteristics.114  Indeed, his bill directed the 
sentencing commission, when drafting guidelines, to consider several 
specific offender characteristics: age, mental and emotional condition, 
physical condition, drug dependence, criminal history, and dependence 
upon criminal activity for a livelihood.115  In his openness to offender 
 
 109. Kennedy, supra note 103, at viii.  While giving less emphasis to the point, Kennedy echoed 
the Yale group’s view that disparity was also unfair to offenders.  Edward M. Kennedy, Toward a New 
System of Criminal Sentencing: Law With Order, 16 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 353, 362 (1979). 
 110. S. 181, as Kennedy’s first reform bill after the completion of the work of the TCF Task Force 
and the Yale group, will be the principle focus of the remainder of this Section. 
 111. S. 181, 95th Cong. § 3579(a)(2) (1977). 
 112. Kennedy, supra note 109, at 354 (“Current findings suggest that [the rehabilitative] 
approach, although noble in design, has failed dramatically.”). 
 113. See S. REP. NO. 95-605, at 902 (1977) (“[C]oncentration of attention upon the aims of the 
criminal justice system is designed to encourage the intelligent balancing of often competing 
considerations and the intelligent exercise of judicial discretion.”). 
 114. S. 181 § 3579(a)(1). 
 115. Id. § 3803(b).  See also S. REP. NO. 95-605, at 930 (“By including such considerations in the 
formulation of sentencing guidelines, uniform treatment of the characteristics for all defendants 
similarly situated will be promoted.”). 
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characteristics, Kennedy seems closer to the Yale group than the TCF 
Task Force.  Indeed, like the Yale group, Kennedy made clear his 
disdain for mandatory minimums because of their failure to “take into 
account the individual characteristics of the offenders.”116 
Kennedy’s bill also contemplated the consideration of a rich array of 
real-offense characteristics, including the nature and degree of the harm 
caused, whether there was a breach of public trust, role in the offense, 
and (despite the Yale group’s reservations) other criminal activity not 
resulting in a conviction.117  Kennedy’s bill did not, however, explicitly 
address the issue of prosecutorial discretion.  Elsewhere, though, 
Kennedy did write of the need “to establish some form of guideline 
system for prosecutors as well.”118 
Kennedy did not endorse the Yale group’s leveling-down approach to 
severity.  The Kennedy bills included no presumption against 
imprisonment—an omission that provoked explicit criticism from the 
Yale group.119  This is not to say, however, that Kennedy intended his 
bills to increase incarceration rates.  Indeed, in contrast to the TCF Task 
Force, Kennedy made clear that, in general, he did not wish for more 
offenders to be sentenced to prison.120  On the other hand, he believed 
that “[w]e will always need prisons for certain offenders.”121  In short, 
Kennedy seemed to adopt a position of greater neutrality than either of 
the working groups as to the frequency of terms of imprisonment. 
Kennedy did join the Yale report, however, in rejecting mandatory 
sentencing guidelines, leaving it to the court to determine what weight to 
give to the guidelines in light of the authorized purposes of 
sentencing.122  The court could sentence outside the guidelines range “if 
it makes as a part of the record, and discloses to the defendant in open 
court at the time of sentencing, a statement of the specific reason or 
reasons.”123  Indeed, because Kennedy did not even establish a clear 
framework for resolving tensions between the purposes of punishment, 
his bills seemed to contemplate even more judicial discretion than did 
the Yale proposal. 
On the whole, Kennedy’s bill was far closer in spirit to the Yale group 
than it was to the TCF Task Force: sentencing was purpose-driven, 
 
 116. Kennedy, supra note 109, at 369. 
 117. S. 181 § 3803(b). 
 118. Kennedy, supra note 109, at 381. 
 119. O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 63, at 89. 
 120. Kennedy, supra note 103, at vii. 
 121. Id. 
 122. S. 181 § 3579(a). 
 123. Id. § 3579(b). 
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attentive to a wide array of offender and offense characteristics, and 
highly discretionary.  Particularly when contrasted with the rules-based 
approach of the TCF Task Force, it is hard to see how S. 181 would 
deliver the sort of predictability that Kennedy’s rhetoric promised.  In a 
sense, Kennedy adopted the Task Force’s way of characterizing the 
nature of the disparity problem (disparity undercuts deterrence and 
public respect for the law), but the Yale group’s method of structuring a 
solution.  Given tensions between the two approaches, it should not be 
surprising that Kennedy’s bills evolved considerably over time.  In 
particular, the Yale group’s original structure, while never entirely 
eliminated from the Kennedy proposals, was gradually modified so as to 
conform more closely to the Task Force’s emphasis on predictability and 
crime control. 
F.  The SRA: Diminishing Judicial Discretion 
The Kennedy bill, now referred to as the Sentencing Reform Act, 
finally won passage in 1984.124  While marked by the increasingly 
punitive anticrime politics of the 1980s, the SRA also carried forward 
many important themes of earlier reform efforts.  For instance, 
proponents of the SRA asserted that the bill would not only address 
rising crime rates, but also benefit defendants.125  Thus, in characterizing 
the nature of the disparity problem—the elimination of which was said 
to be the “primary goal” of the SRA126—the Senate Committee Report 
sounded themes that echoed both the Yale group (fairness to defendants) 
and the TCF Task Force (crime control): 
 
 124. Stith & Koh, supra note 10, at 261–66.  The critique of the rehabilitative ideal and the rise of 
the uniformity ideal actually led to important legislative reforms on the state level several years before 
Congress adopted federal reforms.  See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 11, at 8 (describing 1976 California 
law).  By 1980, sentencing guidelines systems had been adopted by six counties and three states.  JACK 
M. KRESS, PRESCRIPTION FOR JUSTICE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES 10 
(1980).  The earlier state experiences with sentencing guidelines, particularly Minnesota’s, played an 
influential role in the development of the federal legislation.  Indeed, backers of the SRA touted 
Minnesota’s success and noted the “substantial similarity between the Minnesota legislation and this 
Federal sentencing reform measure.”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 62 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3245.  A thorough consideration of the influence of the state experience on the development of the 
uniformity ideal at the federal level, and vice versa, lies beyond the scope of this Article, but merits 
further research. 
 125. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 39, 49, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3222, 3232.  Because 
the SRA emerged from the Senate Judiciary Committee, this Senate Committee Report on the bill 
constitutes the most relevant legislative history.  For a detailed account of the “masterful” legislative 
maneuvering that led to enactment of the Senate bill, notwithstanding the House Judiciary Committee’s 
preference for a very different sort of sentencing reform, see Stith & Koh, supra note 10, at 264–66. 
 126. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3235. 
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A sentence that is unjustifiably high compared to sentences for similarly 
situated offenders is clearly unfair to the offender; a sentence that is 
unjustifiably low is just as plainly unfair to the public.  Such sentences 
are unfair in more subtle ways as well.  Sentences that are 
disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense create a disrespect for 
the law.  Sentences that are too severe create unnecessary tensions among 
inmates and add to disciplinary problems in the prisons.127 
As to purposes, the SRA took essentially the same approach as the 
early Kennedy bills: deterrence, incapacitation, and desert were all 
endorsed without any particular conceptual framework for resolving 
tensions.128  Unlike S. 181, the SRA also endorsed rehabilitation, but in 
a much more limited fashion than the other purposes: rehabilitation 
might be considered in setting the terms and conditions of a sentence, 
but not as a justification for a decision to incarcerate for a particular 
length of time.129 
While the SRA did not otherwise prioritize particular purposes, its 
proponents contemplated that uniformity would be purpose-driven.  
Purposes would come into play at two different levels.  First, the new 
Sentencing Commission would derive sentencing guidelines from an 
analysis of purposes.  Proponents made clear that the SRA was “not 
designed to require the Sentencing Commission to recommend a 
continuation of current sentencing practices.”130  Rather, as the Senate 
Committee put it, “Logic and reason on the part of the Sentencing 
Commission, as reviewed and accepted by the Congress, will control the 
length of the recommended terms.”131  Second, in implementing the new 
guidelines regime, sentencing judges would themselves “consider what 
impact, if any, each particular purpose should have on the sentence in 
each case.”132  (As we will see, however, the ability of judges to do this 
 
 127. Id. at 46.  While sounding familiar themes, the passage reflects a notable rhetorical shift.  
Uniformity is here presented as a matter of balancing defendant interests and public interests, with 
defendant interests associated with low sentences and public with high.  In many earlier 
characterizations of the public interest in sentencing, the public interest had been associated, not with 
high sentences per se, but with “a more equitable, rational, and certain approach to sentencing.”  See, 
e.g., Kennedy, supra note 109, at 369. 
 128. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 67, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3250 (explaining that 
“the Committee has not favored one purpose of sentencing over another”).  The relevant portions of the 
SRA have been codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2). 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2002). 
 130. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 61, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3244.  The House 
Committee’s report on sentencing reform legislation took a similar position.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-
1017, at 100 (1984) (“[D]escriptive guidelines merely lock future decisionmaking into the wisdom—and 
the errors—of the past.”). 
 131. Id. at 116.  See also 28 U.S.C. § 994(m) (“The Commission shall not be bound by [past] 
average sentences . . . .”). 
 132. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 77, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3260. 
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was undercut by other provisions of the SRA.) 
As to offender characteristics, the SRA carried forward language from 
the early Kennedy bills indicating that sentencing judges were to 
consider the “history and characteristics of the defendant.”133  On the 
other hand, there is good reason to believe that, over its many years of 
development, the sentencing reform legislation contemplated a steadily 
decreasing role for offender characteristics.  There was a subtle change, 
for instance, in the treatment of the specific characteristics that had been 
addressed by S. 181 (age, mental and emotional condition, physical 
condition, and drug dependence).134  Where S. 181 would have directed 
the Sentencing Commission to “consider” these factors in drafting the 
sentencing guidelines, the SRA instead commanded the Commission to 
“consider whether . . . [they] have any relevance” and to “take them into 
account only to the extent they do have relevance.”135  Demonstrating 
further skepticism of offender characteristics, the SRA also mandated 
that the guidelines “reflect the general inappropriateness of considering 
the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and 
responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant,”136 and that the 
Commission ensure that the guidelines “are entirely neutral as to the 
race, sex, national origin, creed, and socioeconomic status of 
offenders.”137 
The SRA contemplated real-offense sentencing;138 in the words of the 
Committee Report, “There would be expected to be . . . several guideline 
ranges for a single offense varying on the basis of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.”139  The SRA also contemplated some 
regulation of prosecutorial discretion.  In particular, the statute 
authorized the Sentencing Commission to devise guidelines for the 
acceptance or rejection of plea bargains by judges.140  The provision was 
 
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).  See also S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 53, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3182, 3236 (“[T]he judge is directed to impose sentence after a comprehensive examination of the 
characteristics of the particular offense and the particular offender.” (emphasis added)). 
 134. S. 181, 95th Cong. § 3803(b) (1977). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). 
 136. Id. § 994(e). 
 137. Id. § 994(d). 
 138. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 75, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3258 (listing real-
offense characteristics that should be considered by the sentencing judge). 
 139. Id. at 168.  The House Judiciary Committee, however, expressed strong reservations about 
the “use of sentencing guidelines based on allegations not proved at trial.”  H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 98 
(1984). 
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E).  The House version of the sentencing bill went even further: “[T]he 
legislation also directs the Department of Justice to issue guidelines for U.S. Attorneys to use in 
deciding what charges to bring and what plea bargains to make.  The bill also requires the Judicial 
Conference to prescribe guidelines for judges to use in accepting plea agreements, and authorizes the 
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intended to “assure that judges can examine plea agreements to make 
certain that prosecutors have not used plea-bargaining to undermine the 
sentencing guidelines.”141  On the other hand, the SRA offered 
unqualified support for distinguishing among defendants on the basis of 
their cooperation with prosecutors.142 
With respect to severity, the old leveling-down agenda is manifest in 
at least two provisions: (1) a mandate that judges “impose a sentence 
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with” the approved 
purposes of sentencing;143 and (2) a mandate that the Commission 
“insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of 
imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the 
defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of 
violence or an otherwise serious offense.”144 
However, these vague, question-begging commands145 must be 
viewed in the context of an even greater volume of leveling-up 
language.146  For instance, the SRA directed the Commission to ensure 
“the guidelines reflect the fact that, in many cases, current sentences do 
not accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense.”147  More 
specifically, the SRA mandated a “term of imprisonment” for violent 
crimes that result in serious bodily injury;148 a “substantial term of 
imprisonment” for five broadly defined categories of defendants;149 and 
 
rejection of plea agreements that do not conform to the Department of Justice guidelines.”  H.R. REP. 
NO. 98-1017, at 36.  The House Committee presciently observed, “Discretion appears to be an enduring 
component of any sentencing policy.  Allocating sentences purely on the basis of the offense and the 
offender’s prior record will not eliminate discretion, but merely shift the discretion to an earlier stage.”  
Id. 
 141. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 63, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3246. 
 142. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(n) (“The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general 
appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed . . . to take into account 
a defendant’s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has 
committed an offense.”). 
 143. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added). 
 144. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). 
 145. How is one to apply the “not greater than necessary” principle when the approved purposes 
of sentencing are essentially indeterminate and often in conflict with one another?  Does “general 
appropriateness” imply there are some cases in which it would be appropriate to incarcerate a first-time, 
non-serious offender?  What is a “serious offense”?  Subsequent commentators have found merit in 
Representative Conyers’ criticism of the leveling-down language as “purely cosmetic.”  Stith & Koh, 
supra note 10, at 272. 
 146. The leveling-down provisions reflected the preferences of the House Judiciary Committee.  
See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 37 (1984) (“Too often prison is used for people who could just as 
effectively be punished through nonincarcerative sentences.”).  The Senate version of sentencing reform, 
however, was the one ultimately adopted.  Supra note 125. 
 147. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m). 
 148. 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). 
 149. The categories include defendants who (1) have two or more prior felony convictions; (2) 
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a “term of imprisonment at or near the maximum” for certain drug 
crimes and crimes of violence committed by repeat offenders.150  The 
SRA’s proponents also expected that the bill would result in longer 
sentences for white-collar offenders.151 
In light of these mandates, it should not be surprising that the SRA 
expressly contemplated the possibility that federal prison populations 
would expand under the guidelines.152  While the SRA’s proponents 
may have wished for a decrease in sentence length for some categories 
of offenders, they expected offsetting increases for other categories.153  
They certainly did not desire any form of general leveling down.154 
Finally, and perhaps the most important departure from the early 
Kennedy bills, the SRA contemplated mandatory guidelines—albeit 
through some marvelous legislative doublespeak that left some 
uncertainty as to exactly how binding the “mandatory” guidelines would 
be.  On the one hand, Congress retained language from the early 
Kennedy bills now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), that directs the 
sentencing judge to “consider” the guidelines, in the same way that the 
judge is directed to “consider” the purposes of sentencing, on a case-by-
case basis.  The language seems to suggest—and was certainly 
originally intended by Kennedy to suggest—that a judge might decline 
to impose a guidelines sentence in a particular case if the judge 
determined that the guidelines sentence was inconsistent with the 
statutory purposes of sentencing.155 
On the other hand, Congress also included contradictory language, 
 
derived a substantial portion of their income from criminal activity; (3) participated in racketeering 
activity in a managerial or supervisory capacity; (4) committed a violent felony while on release pending 
trial, sentence, or appeal in another felony case; or (5) committed a specified drug crime.  28 U.S.C. § 
994(i). 
 150. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h). 
 151. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3259. 
 152. 28 U.S.C. § 994(g). 
 153. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 61, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.  3182, 3244 (“The Committee 
is of the view that the Sentencing Commission will probably find, for example, that the sentences for 
some violent offenders are too low and that sentences for some property offenders are too high to serve 
the purposes of sentencing.”). 
 154. For instance, the Senate Committee insisted that the government be given a right to appeal 
sentences because, otherwise, there might be a general leveling down.  “Appellate review for the 
defendant alone would not be an effective weapon to fight disparity, since the appellate court could 
reduce excessive sentences but not raise inadequate ones.  The effort to achieve greater uniformity, 
therefore, might unintentionally result in a gradual scaling down of sentences to the level of the more 
lenient ones.”  Id. at 65. 
 155. This was also how the House legislation was structured.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-1017, at 43 
(1984) (“[T]he determination based on the particular circumstances of the case, that a sentence outside 
the guidelines is the least severe measure sufficient to serve the purposes of sentencing would be an 
adequate reason for departure from the guidelines.”). 
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not found in the early Kennedy bills, but now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b), commanding that the sentencing judge follow the guidelines in 
all cases, unless the judge finds “that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken 
into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described 
[by the guidelines].”156  The language converts the normative question 
suggested by Section 3553(a) (“Would the guidelines sentence be just in 
this case?”) into an empirical question (“Has the Commission thought 
about all of the pertinent circumstances present in this case?”).  
Moreover, the provision further specifies, “In determining whether a 
circumstance was adequately taken into consideration, the court shall 
consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official 
commentary of the Sentencing Commission.”  Section 3553(b) thus 
substantially undercut the authority of the sentencing judge to undertake 
an independent assessment of the purposes of sentencing. 
Viewing the evolution of the Kennedy proposal from S. 181 to the 
SRA, it seems that the TCF Task Force “won” and the Yale group 
“lost.”  This is not to say that the SRA contemplated a guidelines system 
that would exactly mirror the Task Force’s plan, but, rather, that the 
direction of evolution generally favored the Task Force’s version of 
uniformity.  Particularly, in comparison with S. 181, the SRA was 
considerably less receptive to offender characteristics, judicial 
discretion, and the case-by-case consideration of purposes.  
Additionally, the SRA thoroughly repudiated the Yale group’s leveling-
down agenda. 
G.  The Guidelines: Neglecting Purposes and Defendant Perspectives 
Passage of the SRA led to formation of the Sentencing Commission 
and, in 1987, promulgation of the guidelines.  The guidelines have 
undergone some changes since then, but the basic structure adopted in 
1987 remains intact.  At the heart of the guidelines lies a two-
dimensional grid, with which one may determine the applicable sentence 
range (e.g., 30–37 months) using the two variables of “offense level” 
and criminal history.157  These two variables are quantified through the 
 
 156. Most of this language was originally inserted into the Kennedy reform bills through a floor 
amendment to S. 1437, one of the 1977 bills, which was proposed by Senator Gary Hart.  Stith & Koh, 
supra note 10, at 245–46.  This language was then retained through the various subsequent iterations of 
the Kennedy reforms.  A 1987 amendment added the “of a kind, or to a degree” phrase.  Miller & 
Wright, supra note 10, at 747–48. 
 157. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, Pt. A (2003). 
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application of hundreds of pages of rules set forth in chapters two 
through four of the official Guidelines Manual.  Most of the sentencing 
factors incorporated into these provisions serve to increase sentence 
length; the guidelines include few mitigating factors.  Perhaps the most 
important mitigating factor is “acceptance of responsibility,”158 which 
reduces the offense level by two or three points and which is normally 
granted as a matter of course to defendants who plead guilty.159  (This 
represents, on average, about a 25%–35% reduction in sentence 
length.160)  After determining the applicable guidelines range, the court 
might select a sentence within that range or, under certain 
circumstances, “depart” upward or downward from that range.161  The 
most common basis for departure is the defendant’s “substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person,” but this 
sort of departure may only be granted upon the prosecutor’s motion.162  
Alternatively, as indicated in the SRA, the court may depart on the basis 
of an aggravating or mitigating circumstance “of a kind, or to a degree, 
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission.”163 
In many respects, the work of the Commission was dictated, or at 
least strongly suggested, by the SRA.  In other respects, the first 
Sentencing Commission left its own distinctive imprint on the federal 
system’s evolving uniformity ideal, reflecting the particular mix of 
personalities on the Commission.  Members of note included Judge 
(now Justice) Stephen Breyer; Paul Robinson, a criminal law professor 
known for his support of the just deserts approach to sentencing; and 
Michael Block, an economics professor who advocated efficient 
deterrence and the use of cost-benefit analysis in developing the 
guidelines.164 
In attempting to minimize unwarranted disparity, the Commission 
emphasized two purposes.  First, echoing the TCF Task Force, the 
Commission wished for guidelines to provide greater certainty of 
punishment, and, hence, a stronger deterrent effect.165  Second, the 
 
 158. Id. § 3E1.1. 
 159. O’Hear, supra note 18, at 1509. 
 160. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 
2488–89 (2004). 
 161. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Pt. 5K (2003). 
 162. Id. § 5K1.1. 
 163. Id. § 5K2.0. 
 164. See, e.g., Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate 
Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 395 (1991). 
 165. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(d) (1987) (“The Commission’s view is 
that the definite prospect of prison, though the term is short, will act as a significant deterrent to many of 
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Commission wished for the guidelines to ensure greater proportionality 
of punishment.166  This goal, while not systematically elaborated, 
seemed chiefly to entail calibrating punishment to objective, harm-based 
offense characteristics.167  This goal might plausibly have been intended 
to advance deterrence and/or desert purposes.168  In any event, the 
Commission recognized that there was tension between its goals of 
certainty and proportionality.169  Carried to an extreme, the 
proportionality ideal would seek to tailor sentences “to fit every 
conceivable wrinkle of each case”—an “unworkable” objective that 
would “seriously compromise the certainty of punishment.”170  Thus, the 
Commission characterized the guidelines as an effort to “balance” 
certainty with proportionality.171 
It is striking, though, that, in the discussion of its overarching 
objectives, the Commission made no explicit reference to protecting 
defendants from biased or otherwise unjustifiably long sentences, an oft-
repeated concern of sentencing reformers right through passage of the 
SRA.  To be sure, proportionality might, in theory, have protective 
effects, but it is hard to view the guidelines system as meaningfully 
protective when it starts with a presumption in favor of incarceration172 
and includes so many more aggravating than mitigating factors to adjust 
sentence length.173  The Commission’s understanding of 
“proportionality” seems less about protecting defendants than enhancing 
public respect for the law, which is precisely how the term was used in 
 
these crimes . . . .”).  Part 1A of the Guidelines Manual has been revised several times since the original 
version went into effect on November 1, 1987.  The original version of Part 1A is reprinted as part of 
commentary in U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.1 (2003). 
 166. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 1A3 (1987) (“Congress sought 
proportionality in sentencing through a system that imposes appropriately different sentences for 
criminal conduct of different severity.”). 
 167. See id. (referring to relevant factors in proportionality analysis of bank robbery as use of a 
gun, type and degree of injury, identity of victim, time of day, motive, accomplices, number of 
robberies, and intoxication, but not identifying history and personal characteristics of defendant). 
 168. For a discussion of the guidelines’ implicit purposes, see infra text accompanying notes 250–
52. 
 169. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (1987). 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. 
 172. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 60–65 (discussing Commission decisions designed 
to increase sentence lengths). 
 173. For instance, the drug guideline contains five aggravating circumstances and one mitigating, 
while the theft guideline contains fourteen aggravating circumstances and not even  one mitigating.  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2D1.1, 2B1.1 (2003).  Chapter Three of the Guidelines Manual, 
which contains additional sentence adjustments that apply across offense types, includes ten categories 
of upward adjustment and only two of downward. 
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the Senate Committee Report accompanying the SRA.174 
The Commission also took a surprising position with respect to 
purposes of sentencing.  From Frankel on, reformers had emphasized a 
need to sort out the purposes of sentencing, deciding which purposes 
were paramount in which categories of cases.  When it came time to 
make the hard decisions, however, the Commission reached an impasse: 
it could not resolve the threshold dispute between the just deserts 
approach (represented by Commissioner Robinson) and the utilitarian 
crime control approach (represented by Commissioner Block).175  The 
Commission thus expressly abandoned the effort to develop purpose-
driven guidelines in favor of an “empirical approach that uses data 
estimating the existing sentencing system as a starting point.”176  In so 
doing, the Commission seemingly violated the SRA’s mandate that it 
“independently develop a sentencing range that is consistent with the 
purposes of sentencing.”177 
The Commission did consciously deviate from past practices in some 
respects, perhaps most notably in its decision to minimize the role of 
offender characteristics.178  While the SRA reflected some skepticism of 
offender characteristics, the guidelines actually promulgated by the first 
Commission went far beyond what the SRA required.  For instance, as 
described above, the SRA directed the Commission to consider the 
relevance of a host of offender characteristics, including age, mental and 
emotional condition, physical condition, and drug dependence.  All were 
found by the Commission to be “not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.”179  
Within five years of promulgation of the original guidelines, the 
Commission made similar pronouncements with respect to military, 
civic, charitable, or public service; employment-related contributions; 
record of prior good works; lack of guidance as a youth; and other 
 
 174. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3229.  Chairman 
Wilkins also emphasized this objective during public hearings on the guidelines.  U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC HEARINGS 3 (1988) (reprinting statements from hearing of April 15, 
1986: “Unwarranted sentencing disparity undermines public confidence in our system, and breeds 
disrespect for the rule of law.”). 
 175. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 53–55. 
 176. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A3 (1987). 
 177. 28 U.S.C. § 994(m).  For a similar argument, see Aaron J. Rappaport, Unprincipled 
Punishment: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Troubling Silence About the Purposes of Punishment, 6 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1043, 1045 (2003). 
 178. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 19 (1988). 
 179. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1, 5H1.2, 5H1.3, 5H1.4 (1995). 
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circumstances indicating a disadvantaged upbringing.180  The guidelines 
also incorporated the additional constraints on offender characteristics 
expressly mandated by the SRA.181  In sum, while the Commission did 
not entirely prohibit the consideration of offender characteristics, it did 
strongly discourage the use of just about every traditionally important 
offender characteristic other than criminal history. 
While the Commission adopted a much more parsimonious approach 
to offender characteristics than was required, the Commission chose a 
very different path as to offense characteristics, mandating consideration 
of a vast array of variables.  Indeed, the federal guidelines go much 
farther down the path of real-offense sentencing than any state 
guidelines system.182  Consider, for instance, the robbery guideline, 
which distinguishes among defendants based on: (1) the identity of the 
victim; (2) the use of a firearm; (3) the use of another “dangerous 
weapon”; (4) the making of a death threat; (5) the severity of any bodily 
injury suffered; (6) the occurrence of any “physical restraint” or 
abduction; (7) the nature of any nonmonetary items that were targeted 
by the robber; and (8) the amount of money lost.183  Nothing in the SRA 
mandates the many distinctions drawn under just this one guideline. 
At the same time, the guidelines largely neglect some potentially 
relevant offense characteristics, particularly such subjective 
characteristics as mens rea, motive, mistake, and mental impairment.184  
Did the robber intentionally cause injury, or was it an accident?  Was the 
robbery an act of desperation by a person in dire financial 
circumstances?  Was the robbery provoked in some manner by the 
victim?  The guidelines pay little heed to such subjective variables, in 
favor of assessing the nature and degree of the harm risked or caused by 
the defendant’s conduct.185 
 
 180. Id. §§ 5H1.11, 5H1.12. 
 181. See id. §§ 5H1.10, 5H1.2, 5H1.5, 5H1.6 (prohibiting consideration of race, sex, national 
origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status, and stating that education, vocational skills, 
employment record, family ties and responsibilities, and community ties are “not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range”).  The Commission’s 
language prohibiting or discouraging use of these offender characteristics may be stronger than was 
strictly required by the SRA.  For an argument to this effect, see STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 
74–75. 
 182. TONRY, supra note 10, at 78. 
 183. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2B3.1 (1995). 
 184. Gerard E. Lynch, The Sentencing Guidelines as a Not-So-Model Penal Code, 7 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 112, 113, (1994); Michael M. O’Hear, Sentencing The Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, 
Culpability, and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133, 220–22, 266–67 (2004). 
 185. See Lynch, supra note 184, at *3 (“To a much greater degree than any state penal law, the 
guidelines have turned gradations of culpability on rather crude quantifiable factors.”).  Hofer and 
Allenbaugh describe a variety of guidelines provisions that do take offense considerations other than 
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The emphasis on objective offense characteristics relates to another 
important structural decision by the Commission: the adoption of a 
rules-based approach.  Had the guidelines required a routine assessment 
of mental states, more would have been left to the subjective judgment 
of the sentencing court.  By contrast, questions like “Was there a gun?” 
and “How much money was stolen?” entail a more limited, less 
discretionary form of fact-finding.186  The SRA did not, strictly 
speaking, mandate the rules-based approach, but the bill’s proponents 
likely contemplated just such an approach.187  It is not as clear, however, 
whether they desired the Commission to go quite so far as it did in 
writing hundreds of pages of bright-line rules to make thousands of fine-
grained distinctions among defendants.188 
Of course, a sentencing judge might evade the effect of all of these 
bright-line rules by departing.  However, the Commission expected that 
judges would not depart very often, and made clear that departures were 
limited to “atypical” or “unusual” cases.189  Moreover, through its 
treatment of offender characteristics, the Commission carefully 
restricted the ability of sentencing judges to depart on the basis of just 
those factors that judges might be most inclined to view as making a 
case suitable for lenience.190 
 
harm into account, perhaps most notably the role-in-the-offense adjustment.  Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. 
Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 66–67 (2003).  They recognize, however, the greater weight 
accorded harm, id. at 64–66, 69, and note criticisms of this tendency, id. at 69–71. 
 186. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 69 (“Quantification of harm was an attractive 
approach for the Commission, at least initially, because it permitted the agency to distinguish among 
defendants on the basis of apparently objective and precisely measured criteria.  Tying sentence severity 
to quantity of harm would thus reduce the scope of judicial discretion . . . .”). 
 187. By virtue of its numerous directives that the Commission “consider” this or that specific 
factor or “assure” a particular type of sentence in particular circumstances, 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(c)–(e), (h)–
(j) (2000), the SRA at least implied that the Commission should structure the guidelines around a menu 
of objective offense characteristics and criminal history categories.  The Committee Report lends 
support to this view: “[The SRA] contemplates a detailed set of sentencing guidelines . . . .  The 
Committee expects that there will be numerous guidelines ranges, each range describing a somewhat 
different combination of offender characteristics and offense circumstances.”  S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 
168 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3351 (emphasis added). 
 188. See id. at 168 n.405 (expressing expectation that Commission would conduct an evaluation 
“to assure that the guidelines are not so complex as to detract from their effective use”). 
 189. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(a) (1987).  Departures are further 
discouraged by the SRA’s rules of appellate review, which permit review of decisions to depart, but not 
of decisions refusing to depart.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)–(b).  Professor Berman has forcefully argued that 
Congress intended a less rule-like system than the Commission and the appellate courts actually 
developed, and that the SRA contemplated more discretion to depart based on judicial consideration of 
the purposes of punishment.  See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: 
Fixing a Jurisprudence That Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
21 (2000). 
 190. To be sure, judges were given discretion to take offender characteristics, or just about 
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As for severity, the Commission made explicit the implicit leveling-
up agenda of the SRA.191  The Commission estimated that its own policy 
decisions, as distinct from Congressional mandates, would increase 
prison populations by about ten percent over ten years.192  This may be 
surprising, given the Commission’s professed reliance on past practices 
as its baseline, but the Commission deviated from past practices in 
several respects, and these deviations collectively worked to the great 
disadvantage of defendants.  For instance, the Commission 
systematically chose to increase sentences for white-collar offenses,193 
as well as other categories of offenses and offenders for whom Congress 
had mandated a “substantial term of imprisonment.”194  Additionally, 
where recently enacted statutory minimums required longer sentences, 
the guidelines exaggerated the effect by requiring sentences above the 
new minimums in most cases.195 
With respect to prosecutorial discretion, the real-offense aspects of 
the guidelines imposed some limitations on the sentencing significance 
of the formal offense of conviction.196  On the other hand, the 
Commission did not take advantage of its authority under the SRA to 
regulate plea acceptance practices.197  Nor did the Commission suggest 
any sort of mechanism by which sentencing judges might take into 
account disparities in initial charging decisions.  Moreover, the 
guidelines enhanced prosecutorial discretion by making the substantial 
assistance departure dependent on a prosecutor’s motion. 
In addition to the substantial assistance departure, the guidelines also 
 
anything else, into account when selecting a sentence within a specified guidelines range.  However, 
because the guidelines ranges are narrow—they are limited to the greater of six months or a twenty-five 
percent difference between the top and bottom of range, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 1A4(h) (1987)—this locus of discretion is of minimal significance. 
 191. “Conspiracy theorists” have suggested that the harshness of the first Commission may have 
resulted from the interest of some commissioners in higher judicial office; “the guidelines were an effort 
to show that the commission’s policies were consonant with the views of influential congressional 
conservatives.”  TONRY, supra note 10, at 12. 
 192. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(g) (1987). 
 193. Breyer, supra note 178, at 20–21; U.S. SENTENCING  GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A4(d) (1987). 
 194. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 10, at 60. 
 195. Id. 
 196. The relevant provisions include complex rules for handling multiple counts, see U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3D (1988), which were designed “with an eye toward eliminating 
unfair treatment that might flow from count manipulation.” Id. § 1A4(a). 
 197. Id. § 1A4(c) (1988).  As William Wilkins, the first Commission’s first Chair, explained it, the 
failure to tackle plea-bargaining more aggressively resulted from the Commission’s concern over 
creating “unanticipated problems” in a process that was “fundamental to the operation of the justice 
system.”  William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of the 
Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 23 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 188 (1988). 
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included other inducements for cooperation, including a penalty for 
obstruction of justice198 and the “acceptance of responsibility” benefit 
for guilty pleas.199  The Commission thus decisively embraced 
cooperation as an appropriate basis on which to distinguish 
defendants—an important policy decision on which many reform 
advocates, including Frankel and the Yale group, had reserved 
judgment. 
H.  The Feeney Amendment: Reducing Departures 
The guidelines embody a particular vision of uniformity: short terms 
of imprisonment are a baseline norm, with a complicated, real-offense, 
harm-based set of rules increasing sentence length from the norm, and 
some limited opportunities for judges to consider offender 
characteristics and the purposes of sentencing on a case-by-case basis, 
principally through the departure mechanism.  If not strictly mandated 
by the SRA, this approach was at least arguably consistent with the 
expectations of the statute’s proponents in Congress.  However, while 
the basic structure of the guidelines remained static, the mindset of both 
Congress and the judiciary evolved considerably, and in quite different 
directions, in the two decades following the enactment of the SRA.  
Conflict between the two branches of government became inevitable, 
with the Commission and the guidelines caught in the middle. 
On the one hand, Congress increasingly sought greater certainty and 
severity in punishment, particularly through the enactment of mandatory 
minimums.200  Notable examples include the federal “three strikes and 
you are out” law201 and the notorious mandatory sentences for crack 
cocaine offenses.202 
The judiciary, on the other hand, followed a different and more 
complicated path.  After an initial period of uncertainty in which the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission was in doubt,203 courts 
seemingly settled into a pattern of compliance with the Commission’s 
mandates.  Over time, however, downward departure rates gradually 
 
 198. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (1987). 
 199. Id. § 3E1.1. 
 200. TONRY, supra note 10, at 134.  These mandatory minimums represented an implicit vote of 
no confidence in the guidelines, and they were consistently opposed by the Commission.  William W. 
Wilkins, Jr., Mandatory Minimum Penalties, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 201, 201 (1993). 
 201. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE 
OUT IN CALIFORNIA 4 (2001). 
 202. Michael M. O’Hear, Federalism and Drug Control, 57 VAND. L. REV. 783, 800–01 (2004). 
 203. TONRY, supra note 10, at 73–74. 
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grew to more than one-third of all cases.204  The Supreme Court may 
have contributed to this trend through its 1996 decision in Koon v. 
United States, which held that departures should be reviewed by 
appellate courts using the deferential abuse of discretion standard.205  
Other factors, however, were also involved.  Indeed, rising departure 
rates were arguably more the responsibility of prosecutors than of 
judges: by 2001, about two-thirds of downward departures were made at 
the behest of prosecutors,206 and downward departures were almost 
never appealed by the government.207  Still, while prosecutors may 
encourage or acquiesce, the decision to depart ultimately lies with the 
judge.  Rising departure rates can thus fairly be characterized as an 
indication that many judges lack a strong commitment to the guidelines’ 
vision of uniformity.208 
Such views are also expressed through what Professors Schulhofer 
and Nagel have referred to as “guidelines circumvention.”209  
Circumvention differs from departing: where departing is an open and 
explained deviation from an otherwise applicable guidelines range, 
circumvention is a form of covert manipulation of the guidelines 
sentencing process.  Judges and prosecutors, working independently or 
in concert, can circumvent through a number of strategies.  These 
include dismissing selected charges so as to reduce the statutory 
maximum sentence below the otherwise applicable guidelines range, or 
finding or stipulating to a set of sentencing facts or factors that is 
incomplete or untrue.  For instance, a prosecutor might stipulate for 
sentencing purposes that a bank robber had no gun, even though there is 
reliable evidence that a gun was carried.  The judge might never learn of 
the evidence, or might collude with the parties in ignoring the evidence. 
Circumvention of this nature might be motivated by a good-faith 
 
 204. For a striking graphic representation of these trends, see Marc L. Miller, Domination & 
Dissatisfaction: Prosecutors as Sentencers, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1211, 1228 (2004).  If we control for the 
nature of the offense and the district of sentencing, however, departure trends appear far less dramatic.  
Max Schanzenbach, Have Federal Judges Changed Their Sentencing Practices? The Shaky Empirical 
Foundations of the Feeney Amendment, 2 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDIES 1, 28–29 (2005). 
 205. 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).  Because departure rates were increasing even before Koon, 
however, it is not clear that the decision actually had an important effect.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,  
REPORT TO CONGRESS: DOWNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 54 
(2003). 
 206. Id. at 60. 
 207. Id. at 56. 
 208. See also Miller, supra note 204, at 1237–38 (discussing empirical evidence of judicial dislike 
of the guidelines). 
 209. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 
1284, 1289 (1997). 
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desire to reach a “just” sentence notwithstanding the guidelines.  Or 
circumvention might represent an effort to “sweeten the pot” in plea 
negotiations, thereby better inducing defendant cooperation.  Either way, 
leading studies suggest that circumvention occurs in a third or more of 
cases resolved through a guilty plea.210 
By 2003, both the formal content of the guidelines and, to an even 
greater extent, the real-world implementation of the guidelines were out 
of step with the preferences of congressional Republicans and John 
Ashcroft’s Department of Justice (DOJ).  Their response was embodied 
in the so-called Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act.211  
Sponsored by Republican Congressman Tom Feeney, and vigorously 
supported by DOJ, the Amendment resulted in the most important 
changes to federal sentencing law since the promulgation of the 
guidelines.212 
Proponents of the Feeney Amendment made no secret of their single, 
overriding objective: a reduction in rates of downward departure.213  
(Upward departures were not of any apparent concern.  Circumvention 
was addressed only obliquely through mild efforts to control 
prosecutorial discretion.)  This objective, in turn, was motivated chiefly 
by considerations of crime control.  In particular, it was argued that 
downward departures threatened to undermine the deterrent functions of 
the guidelines.  As Feeney put it on the floor of the House: 
I would just say that equality in sentencing is important for a number of 
reasons.  Number one, we want to send a message to criminals and 
would-be criminals . . . . 
 I think that is what this amendment does.  I think it provides 
certainty.  I think it provides a very important deterrent effect.  We will 
have a lot less child abuse, a lot less child pornography, and perhaps less 
kidnapping if we adopt this amendment.214 
DOJ echoed these views: “The consistency, predictability, and 
toughness that Congress sought to achieve in the Sentencing Reform 
Act . . . is being undermined by steadily increasing downward 
 
 210. See, e.g., id. at 1290.  In one survey of probation officers, forty percent indicated that, in a 
majority of cases, the guideline calculations set forth in plea agreements do not “accurately and 
completely reflect all aspects of the case.”  David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, 
and Do Not Like What They See, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996). 
 211. “PROTECT” stands for Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of 
Children Today.  PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 212. Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 310, 310–11 (2003). 
 213. See Congressman Tom Feeney, Reaffirming the 1984 Sentencing Reforms, 27 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 383, 383 (2004) (“I sponsored the Feeney Amendment to address the increasing occurrence of 
downward departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines . . . .”). 
 214. 149 CONG. REC. H2424 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Feeney). 
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departures.”215 
[T]he real and immediate prospect of significant periods of incarceration 
is necessary to give force to law.  Nothing erodes the deterrent power of 
our laws—and breeds contempt for obeying the law—more quickly than 
if certain criminals appear to receive punishment not according to the 
gravity of the offense, but according to their social or economic stature.216 
Consistent with its objectives of predictability and deterrence, the 
Feeney Amendment reflected a deep skepticism of offender 
characteristics.  Indeed, as first introduced, the Amendment would have 
converted several discouraged grounds for departure (“not ordinarily 
relevant”) into prohibited grounds (“not relevant”), including such 
notable offender characteristics as family ties and responsibilities; 
community ties; and military, civic, charitable, or public service.217  As 
finally enacted, the new restrictions on offender characteristics were 
limited to child crimes and sex offenses.218  While Congress did not 
directly impose further limitations on the consideration of offender 
characteristics, the Feeney Amendment’s attempts to discourage 
downward departures more broadly must be understood, at least in part, 
as an effort to accomplish the same ends by indirect means. 
These general departure-discouraging features mark the Feeney’s 
Amendment’s vision of uniformity as even more rules-based than that of 
the original Commission.  After all, the departure mechanism—the 
regular use of which was discouraged, but not clearly prohibited, by the 
Commission—offered judges their most important opportunity in the 
guidelines regime to exercise discretion and consider the purposes of 
sentencing. 
The Feeney Amendment attempted to reduce downward departure 
rates through several different provisions.  First, Congress essentially 
prohibited downward departures in cases involving particular child 
crimes or sex offenses (other than on the ground of substantial 
assistance).219  Second, Congress gave the Commission 180 days to 
 
 215. Letter from Jamie E. Brown, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of 
Legislative Affairs to Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary (April 4, 
2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 355, 356 (2003). 
 216. Statement of U.S. Attorney James B. Comey Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on 
Crime and Drugs (June 19, 2002), in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 323, 323 (2003). 
 217. Vinegrad, supra note 212, at 310. 
 218. Id. at 313.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2) (2000); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
5K2.0(b) (2004) (reflecting changes made by Feeney Amendment as enacted). 
 219. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A), which codifies relevant provisions of the Feeney 
Amendment, downward departures are not permitted in cases involving particular child crimes or sex 
offenses except on the basis of mitigating circumstances that have been “affirmatively and specifically 
identified” as permissible grounds for departure.  In implementing this provision, the Commission has 
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promulgate “appropriate amendments to the sentencing guidelines, 
policy statements, and official commentary to ensure that the incidence 
of downward departures are substantially reduced,”220 and prohibited the 
Commission from approving any new grounds for downward departure 
for two years.221  Third, Congress directed the Attorney General “to 
ensure that DOJ attorneys oppose sentencing adjustments, including 
downward departures, that are not supported by the facts and the law”; 
to ensure that line prosecutors would report “adverse sentencing 
decisions” to DOJ superiors in Washington; and “to ensure the vigorous 
pursuit of appropriate and meritorious appeals of such adverse 
decisions.”222  Fourth, Congress overturned the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Koon by replacing the abuse-of-discretion standard with de 
novo appellate review of departure decisions.223  The message was clear: 
Congress expected the Commission, DOJ, and the appellate courts to 
police downward departures much more aggressively. 
There can be no doubt that the Feeney Amendment reflected a 
leveling-up agenda: Congress’s target was downward departures, not 
upward.  For instance, while eliminating most downward departure 
authority in child and sex crime cases, Congress did not modify upward 
departure authority in such cases.224  Moreover, even provisions that did 
not formally distinguish between upward and downward departures, 
such as those concerning enhanced appellate review, must be understood 
as truly targeting downward departures in light of the reality that upward 
departures are quite rare.225 
In addition to reducing judicial discretion, the Feeney Amendment 
also sought to regulate prosecutorial discretion, albeit in a much more 
 
indicated that only the very few grounds identified in Part 5K of the guidelines satisfy the “affirmatively 
and specifically identified” test.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(b) (2004). 
 220. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m)(2)(A), 117 Stat. 650 (2003).  In response to 
this mandate, the Commission prohibited departures on the basis of extraordinary acceptance of 
responsibility, mitigating role in the offense, guilty plea, or fulfillment of restitution obligations.  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0(d) (2004). 
 221. PROTECT Act § 4(j)(2). 
 222. Id. § 401(l)(1).  Technically, the Feeney Amendment gave DOJ a choice between 
undertaking these measures or reporting all non-substantial-assistance departures to Congress within 
fifteen days.  Id. § 401(l)(3).  DOJ chose the former option.  See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, 
Attorney Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors (July 28, 2003), reprinted in 15 FED. SENT’G REP. 375 (2003) 
(outlining DOJ policies regarding sentencing in response to PROTECT Act mandate). 
 223. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(2).  Congress also added new grounds for reversal of a departure, 
including the failure of a departure to advance the statutory purposes of sentencing.  Id. § 401(d)(1).  
Additionally, Congress restricted the ability of a district court judge to depart after a remand for 
resentencing.  Id. § 401(e)(2). 
 224. Id. § 401(b)(1)(B). 
 225. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 205, at 32 (showing upward departure rate below one 
percent each year from 1995 through 2001). 
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modest fashion.  As noted above, the Amendment required DOJ to take 
a more aggressive role in policing guidelines compliance and resisting 
downward departures “not supported by the facts and the law.”226  
Moreover, Congress sought to regulate for the first time a particularly 
controversial exercise of prosecutorial discretion: the creation of so-
called “early disposition” programs by individual United States 
Attorney’s Offices (USAOs).  These programs offered certain categories 
of defendants favorable deals in return for particularly quick guilty 
pleas, resulting in sentence reductions that were not contemplated by the 
guidelines.227  The Feeney Amendment required that such programs 
receive the Attorney General’s authorization, bringing them under some 
centralized control, and limited the maximum sentence benefit for the 
“early disposition departure” to four offense levels.228 
The Feeney Amendment should nonetheless be viewed as an 
affirmation of cooperation benefits and, to a lesser extent, prosecutorial 
discretion.  At the same time that the Amendment adopted the first 
explicit regulations for early disposition programs, it also accorded such 
programs a statutory legitimacy that had previously been lacking.  
Moreover, the regulations left considerable implementation discretion in 
the hands of DOJ and line prosecutors, for instance, by requiring a 
prosecutor’s motion for any early disposition departure.229  Additionally, 
under the Feeney Amendment, substantial assistance departures were 
carved out of, or otherwise effectively insulated from, the new 
departure-discouraging provisions.230  Finally, Congress also endorsed 
 
 226. PROTECT Act § 401(l)(1).  DOJ implemented these requirements of the Feeney Amendment 
through memoranda from Attorney General Ashcroft dated July 28, 2003, and September 22, 2003.  
Benson B. Weintraub & Benedict P. Kuehne, The Feeney Frenzy: A Case Study in Actions and 
Reactions in the Politics of Sentencing, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 114, 116 (2003).  Under these memoranda, 
“federal prosecutors must charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that 
are supported by the facts of the case.”  Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., to All 
Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), reprinted in 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 129, 130 (2003).  The 
memoranda also prohibit fact-bargaining for sentencing purposes.  Id. at 131–32.  For a discussion of the 
limitations of the Ashcroft Memoranda as effective checks on prosecutorial discretion, see infra text 
accompanying notes 306–09. 
 227. O’Hear, supra note 13, at 372. 
 228. PROTECT Act § 401(m)(2)(B).  These provisions suggest that the real story of the Feeney 
Amendment may be less a matter of Congress versus the courts, as the legislation is conventionally 
characterized, than the center (Congress and Main Justice) versus the periphery (district court judges and 
line prosecutors). 
 229. O’Hear, supra note 13, at 378–80. 
 230. For instance, the limitations on downward departures in child and sex crime cases did not 
apply to substantial assistance departures.  PROTECT Act § 401(b).  Likewise, the new appellate review 
provisions have little relevance for substantial assistance departures; because such departures require a 
prosecutor’s motion, it would be highly unusual for a prosecutor to appeal a substantial assistance 
departure. 
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the acceptance of responsibility adjustment, but actually increased 
prosecutorial discretion by make the full three-point discount (“super-
acceptance”) contingent for the first time on a prosecutor’s motion.231 
I.  Summary 
This Part has described seven different models of uniformity, each of 
which has an important place in the lineage connecting the important 
pre-legislative reform proposals of the 1970s to the post-Feeney legal 
regime overturned by Booker.  Despite the lines of influence linking 
these seven models, they represent seven quite distinct ways of 
structuring and justifying uniformity.  There is a world of difference, for 
instance, between the Yale group’s proposal (expressly and inclusively 
purpose-driven, standards-based, leveling-down, and encouraging 
consideration of offender characteristics) and Feeney’s version of 
uniformity (emphasizing predictability and deterrence, rules-based, 
leveling-up, and discouraging consideration of offender characteristics).  
In many respects, the differences between the Yale group and Feeney 
reflect the general arc of development of the uniformity ideal, with the 
chronologically in-between models generally embodying in-between 
views on, say, judicial discretion, severity, and offender characteristics. 
Because of its association with the unpopular Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, uniformity has acquired a bad name in some circles.  
Excavating its history, however, demonstrates that uniformity does not 
need to mean what it later came to mean.  Uniformity need not be 
viewed principally as a crime control measure, but might instead be 
viewed as protective of defendants, with an explicit leveling down 
agenda.  Uniformity need not implement desert, deterrence, or any other 
particular purpose of sentencing.  Uniformity need not elevate offense 
characteristics over offender characteristics.  Indeed, some reformers in 
the 1970s asserted that this practice was precisely the problem to be 
addressed: the “major source of disparity,” in their view, was 
“sentencing according to the particular offense” instead of “the character 
of the defendant and the needs of rehabilitative treatment.”232 
Uniformity need not be implemented through a complex set of rules: 
it might be implemented through a system of purposes and standards, as 
in the Yale model, or through a set of relatively simple rules, as in the 
TCF Task Force model.  Finally, while other features of the pre-Booker 
uniformity scheme (broad prosecutorial discretion and significant 
 
 231. Id. § 401(g)(2). 
 232. NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, MODEL SENTENCING ACT 2 (2d ed. 1972). 
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cooperation benefits) were not so clearly contrary to early reform 
models, they were at least called into question by early reformers. 
None of these features, in short, can fairly be called essential to the 
uniformity ideal, understood as an organic, historical concept.  As 
Professor Allen said of the rehabilitative ideal, the uniformity ideal 
“embraces great complexity and, indeed, encompasses widely different 
and even conflicting kinds of social policies.”233  The next Part explores 
one particularly important, but previously underappreciated, area of 
tension within the uniformity ideal. 
III.  THE PURPOSES AND PREDICTABILITY PARADIGMS 
This Part describes two competing frameworks for making 
distinctions between warranted and unwarranted disparity.  These two 
paradigms, which I label purposes and predictability, are certainly not 
the only ways of thinking about uniformity; indeed, Part IV below will 
describe another, the dignity paradigm.  But purposes and predictability 
are worthy of particular attention because they have been particularly 
influential in the development of federal sentencing policy. 
A.  Uniformity As Purpose-Driven Sentencing 
Under the purposes paradigm, uniformity requires that all defendants 
be sentenced so as to advance an explicitly identified purpose or set of 
purposes of punishment.  All factors that serve to distinguish defendants 
should relate to the approved purpose or purposes.  The vision here is of 
rational, principled sentencing.234  This need not entail the adoption of 
any one particular purpose of sentencing or of tight constraints on 
judicial discretion.  For instance, among the uniformity models 
discussed in the previous Part, that of the Yale group most clearly 
embodies this paradigm, even though it would have permitted 
considerable judicial discretion in weighing several competing 
purposes.235  What is important is that there is a uniform, principled 
 
 233. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 2. 
 234. Chairman Wilkins seems to have something of this ideal in mind in early Commission 
hearings on the guidelines.  “[W]e must . . . formulate sentences which are rational and explainable,” he 
asserted.  U.S.SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 174, at 4.  “The resulting system will be open and 
understandable, and it must articulate—the judges who impose sentences—to victims who suffer crimes, 
to defendants who are punished, and to the American public in general why a particular sentence is 
appropriate.  It is not enough for us to come up with just sentencing guidelines that give a sentence; we 
must also say why this sentence is being given and, most importantly, why is this the appropriate 
sentence in this particular case.”  Id. 
 235. For a more recent articulation of the purposes paradigm, which emphasizes the role of the 
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analytical process that produces the sentencing outcome.  The lion’s 
share of the analytical work might be done by an expert commission 
considering different types of offenses and offenders on a categorical 
basis, or the analysis might be done entirely by judges on a case-by-case 
basis.236 
What is the appeal of this paradigm?  Most obviously, it helps to 
ensure that the sentencing process is sensitive to particular substantive 
ends of the criminal law, such as deterrence and incapacitation.  The 
problem with this answer, though, is that we lack consensus as to what 
the substantive ends ought to be and how they are most effectively 
implemented.237  Even if we lack confidence in our answers to these 
questions, however, the purposes paradigm may still hold appeal for a 
variety of reasons.  For instance, following the purposes paradigm might 
promote dialogue and experimentation that would help us to better 
understand and evaluate different approaches to sentencing over time. 
Uniformity advocates, however, have emphasized a different value to 
this paradigm: legitimization.  As we have seen, for instance, Frankel 
was quite concerned that the “splatter of varied sentences, with the 
unexplained variations left to be seen as random or worse, nourishes the 
view that there is no justice in the law.”238  The purposes paradigm 
reassures offenders and the public that sentences are principled, which 
may enhance respect for, and adherence to, the law among both 
groups.239 
B.  Uniformity as Predictable Sentencing 
In the predictability paradigm, uniformity focuses not on the 
analytical process, but on the outcome: the final sentence imposed 
should match pre-sentencing expectations.  There are two particularly 
important variants on this paradigm.  In the first, pre-offense (or 
deterrence-type) predictability, the sentence should be determinable at 
the time the crime is planned or perpetrated.  In principle, the offender 
 
Commission, rather than individual judges, in evaluating and applying competing purposes, see 
Rappaport, supra note 177, at 1046, 1059, 1068. 
 236. See Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 413, 415–16 (1992) (discussing 
different procedures by which “[s]entences can be linked to purposes”). 
 237. For a concise summary of the difficulties with leading approaches, see Kenworthey Bilz & 
John M. Darley, What’s Wrong With Harmless Theories of Punishment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1215, 
1222–23 (2004). 
 238. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 42–44. 
 239. Id.; O’DONNELL ET AL., supra note 63, at 38, 58.  For a discussion of empirical support for 
the proposition that perceptions of injustice in the law contribute to diminished compliance with the law, 
see Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2005). 
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should be able to calculate in advance his or her legal exposure, that is, 
the sentence that will be imposed for his or her conduct (e.g., carrying a 
loaded firearm to the drug deal) and any foreseeable consequences of 
that conduct (e.g., someone is shot during the course of the drug deal).  
Frankel defended this form of predictability as a matter of fair notice.240  
Later reformers (such as the TCF Task Force and Kennedy) have 
demanded this form of predictability as a matter of deterring harmful 
conduct.241 
In the second variant, in-system (or cooperation-type) predictability, 
the sentence need not necessarily be predictable at the time the offense is 
committed, but should be determinable at some point before the formal 
sentencing proceeding, probably no later than the time of conviction or 
guilty plea.  The real focus here is on helping defendants to make well-
informed decisions regarding plea-bargaining and other forms of 
cooperation.  Defendants should be able to calculate the sentencing 
consequences of pleading guilty to particular charges, stipulating to 
particular facts, and providing or withholding other forms of 
cooperation.  Once again, Frankel conceived of this type of 
predictability as a matter of fairness to defendants, although it could also 
be justified as way to encourage cooperative behavior by making the 
benefits clearer and more dependable.242 
C.  Tensions Between Purposes and Predictability 
The purposes and predictability paradigms are not strictly inconsistent 
with one another, but they may sometimes point in quite different 
directions.  Consider first how a uniformity system would be structured 
under the predictability paradigm.  First, predictability would prefer 
bright-line rules to standards.  Second, predictability would prefer to 
minimize the number of sentencing factors.243  Third, predictability 
 
 240. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 6.  Beccaria shared this view.  BECCARIA, supra note 57, at 17, 55. 
 241. This form of predictability is objectionable to some.  Predetermined sentences for specific 
acts may look less like punishments than prices—”an invitation to commit crimes offered to all who are 
willing to pay.”  JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING 
DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 73 (2003).  Moreover, recent social scientific research 
suggests that, because of risk aversion, uncertainty may unexpectedly have greater deterrent value than 
certainty.  Tom Baker et al., The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. 
REV. 443, 446–47 (2004). 
 242. O’Hear, supra note 18, at 1564.  Judge Wilkins, who chaired the first Commission, 
emphasized this form of predictability as a significant achievement of the guidelines.  William W. 
Wilkins, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Striking an Appropriate Balance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 571, 584 (1992). 
 243. Increasing the number of factors increases outcome-uncertainty, even if each individual 
factor can be determined in a reasonably reliable fashion; as Professors Ruback and Wroblewski have 
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would disfavor the use of subjective offense characteristics (mens rea, 
motive, and the like), as well as other sorts of factors that would require 
the sentencer to draw inferences or make value judgments 
(disadvantaged upbringing, prior good works, and the like).244  Fourth, 
the pre-offense version of predictability would disfavor the 
consideration of unforeseeable consequences, cooperation, and other 
post-offense occurrences. 
These preferences may be reconciled with the purposes paradigm, but 
only if the authorized purposes are narrowly circumscribed.  For 
instance, under conventional models of general deterrence, sentencing 
would focus on a quite limited number of more-or-less objective 
variables: the expected benefit of the crime, the risk of detection, and the 
harm caused or threatened.245  Likewise, some versions of the just 
deserts model focus on harm as the chief measure of 
blameworthiness.246  Incapacitation models typically rely heavily on 
criminal history, which may also satisfy the requirements of 
predictability.247 
Tensions arise under different or more expansive views of purposes.  
Desert models, for instance, typically place considerable emphasis on 
subjective offense characteristics.248  Broader utilitarian approaches 
 
shown, small reliability problems can have substantial cumulative effects in the context of a complex, 
multifactor guidelines system.  R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: Psychological and Policy Reasons for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 739, 
764–65 (2001). 
 244. Thus, Beccaria, a great proponent of predictable sentencing, argued that “the true measure of 
crimes is . . . the harm done to society.”  BECCARIA, supra note 57, at 64 (emphasis in original).  
Intention, he asserted, “depends on the impression objects actually make and on the precedent 
disposition of the mind; these vary in all men and in each man, according to the swift succession of 
ideas, of passions, and of circumstances.  It would be necessary, therefore, to form not only a particular 
code for each citizen, but a new law for every crime.”  Id. at 65.  Predictability would likewise disfavor 
what Professor Tonry has referred to as “situationally relevant” factors, which must be considered in 
highly context-specific ways.  For instance, “[m]ental abnormality may be a mitigating circumstance 
when it makes the defendant susceptible to manipulation by others, but an aggravating circumstance 
when it reduces a defendant’s ability to control aggressive impulses.”  TONRY, supra note 10, at 23. 
 245. Block, supra note 164, at 397–98; Robinson, supra note 15, at 7.  Whether benefit or harm 
should be the principle measure has been a matter of debate.  Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, 
and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 220–21 (1993).  Determining likelihood 
of detection has also posed a considerable challenge for this approach.  Id. at 219–20. 
 246. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1075, 1076 (1997) (contrasting “harm-based” with “culpability-based” retributivists). 
 247. Sentencing Commission data, for instance, indicate that the formula for criminal history 
scores in the guidelines has considerable predictive power for recidivism.  Linda Drazga Maxfield, 
Measuring Recidivism Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 17 FED. SENT’G REP. 166, 169 (2005). 
 248. See Kyron Huigens, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
811, 818 (2002) (“The existence of discretion, somewhere in the system, to make a context-sensitive 
evaluation of the offender’s conduct and character is intrinsic to criminal law because context-specific, 
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support the consideration of a host of factors, including cooperation 
benefits and the effects of a sentence on third parties, such as children 
and spouses.249  Restorative justice approaches, which are becoming 
more influential, emphasize interactions between offenders and victims 
after the crime, particularly the offender’s expressions of remorse and 
efforts to make amends.250  All of these sorts of approaches, especially 
in combination with one another, seem to point in the direction of 
unpredictability: large numbers of case-specific factors, subjective 
determinations by the sentencer, prudential balancing of purposes, 
important post-offense contingencies, and so forth.251 
In short, assuming an inclusive view of purposes, a strong 
commitment to purpose-driven sentencing is apt to conflict with a strong 
commitment to predictability.  Indeed, the Commission itself has made a 
similar observation.252  Table 1 below compares and contrasts the two 
paradigms in more detail by reference to the essential questions 
discussed in Part I. 
 
retrospective assessments of the offender and his wrongdoing are intrinsic to just punishment.”); Albert 
W. Alshuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Plea for Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
901, 909 (1991) (“A system grounded on ‘just deserts’ need not-indeed should not-focus primarily upon 
harm.”). 
 249. See Brown, supra note 13, at 1383 (arguing in favor of taking third-party effects into 
account, but observing that none of “dominant theories” of criminal punishment permit doing so). 
 250. JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 11–12 (2002). 
 251. Some of these tendencies may conflict with monitoring and enforcement objectives.  Thus, a 
regime of purpose-driven sentencing may seek to constrain judicial discretion in order to minimize the 
likelihood that judges will use (or be perceived as using) broadly defined standards as a cover for 
imposing biased or otherwise poorly reasoned sentences.  If the monitoring and enforcement concerns 
are strong enough, a purpose-driven system may end up looking a lot like a predictability-driven system, 
albeit for very different underlying reasons.  I am grateful to Professor Richman for drawing my 
attention to this point. 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 169–71. 
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Table 1 




Why do we care about 
uniformity? 
Advance desired 
purposes of punishment 
Promote dialogue and 
experimentation 
Persuade public and/or 
offenders of justness of 
sentences 
Pre-offense: Fair notice / 
deterrent message to 
public of penal 
consequences of particular 
conduct 
In-System: Fair notice of 
consequences of plea-
bargaining and other 
conduct in system; reliable 
incentives for cooperation 
What is the role of 
purposes? 
Must be systematically 
linked to sentencing 
outcomes on case-by-
case or categorical basis 
Need not play a central 
role (e.g., nothing wrong 
with empirical approach) 
What is the role of 
offender 
characteristics? 
Must be considered to 
extent necessary to 




What is the role of 
real-offense 
characteristics? 
Same as offender 
characteristics 
Same as offender 
characteristics 




Need not play a central 
role 
Should be norm 









Yes Pre-Offense: Yes 
In-System: Need not 
What is the role of 
cooperation? 
Must be considered to 
extent necessary to 
advance purposes of 
punishment 
Pre-Offense: Disfavored 
In-System: May be 
considered 
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D.  Sentencing Reform Reconsidered 
This Section describes how the tensions between the two paradigms 
have played out in federal sentencing law, demonstrating an important 
shift over time from purposes to predictability.  I have already suggested 
that the Yale group’s proposal nicely captures the spirit of the purposes 
paradigm, while the TCF Task Force’s rules-based proposal offers an 
equally neat illustration of the predictability model.  As discussed in Part 
II above, the earliest Kennedy bills were structured more along the lines 
of the Yale proposal.  By the time of the SRA’s passage, however, 
sentencing reform had taken important steps in the direction of 
predictability.  Under the SRA, the guidelines would be mandatory, not 
advisory, and the use of many offender characteristics was cast into 
doubt.253 
On the other hand, the SRA was by no means hostile to the purposes 
paradigm.254  While the guidelines were to be binding, the guidelines 
were to be drafted with purposes in mind, principally desert, deterrence, 
and incapacitation.  Moreover, under 18 U.S.C. § 1332(a)—the holdover 
provision from early Kennedy bills—judges were instructed to consider 
these same purposes on a case-by-case basis (albeit to uncertain effect, 
in light of the mandatory nature of the guidelines).  It is conceivable that 
the SRA might have been implemented by the Commission and the 
courts in ways that manifested real sensitivity to both the purposes and 
predictability paradigms. 
The Commission, however, managed to create guidelines that 
suffered serious deficiencies under both points of view, a veritable 
“worst of both worlds.”  From the predictability standpoint, the 
guidelines were guilty of the sin of complexity, with thousands of 
sentencing factors spread over hundreds of pages in the Guidelines 
Manual, many employing brand-new terms of art (e.g., acceptance of 
responsibility, minimal role, substantial assistance, heartland) whose 
meaning would have to be painstakingly litigated in case after case.255  
 
 253. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
 254. Nor did it contemplate absolute predictability.  See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150 (1984), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3333 (“Even the fullest consideration and the most subtle 
appreciation of the pertinent factors . . . cannot invariably result in a predictable sentence being imposed.  
Some variation is not only inevitable but desirable.”). 
 255. For a critique of the guidelines focusing on this point, see Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, 
Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1272–74 (1997).  In this 
vein, according to Chairman Wilkins, the Commission specifically chose not to provide an automatic 
discount for guilty pleas, which would have concededly enhanced predictability, because the 
Commission did not believe that such a discount was justified in all cases.  Wilkins, supra note 197, at 
191.  This was an important decision by the Commission, marking a clear preference in this one context 
for purposes over predictability. 
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The departure mechanism was especially troubling, leaving much to the 
discretion of the courts in deciding both whether to depart (e.g., what are 
the boundaries of “not ordinarily relevant”) and by how much to depart 
(essentially a reasonableness standard256).  Finally, contravening the 
preferences of pre-offense predictability, the guidelines gave great 
weight to cooperation and left prosecutorial discretion largely 
untouched. 
From the purposes standpoint, the whole guidelines project was 
fundamentally compromised by the explicit adoption of the empirical 
approach.257  This decision greatly diminished the value of the judicial 
discretion that was potentially available in the departure mechanism and 
elsewhere.  The Commission offered no normative framework for 
making discretionary decisions.  This was in sharp contrast, for instance, 
to the Yale proposal, which not only described three acceptable 
sentencing purposes at some length, but also provided a system for 
resolving inconsistencies between those purposes.  The Commission 
might have incorporated this sort of framework into the departure 
mechanism without any significant loss of predictability in comparison 
to the vague provision that was adopted. 
While the guidelines include no explicit purpose, one may see 
implicit purposes in the guidelines’ emphasis on harm and criminal 
history.  More specifically, one might view much of the Guidelines 
Manual as an effort to implement deterrent, incapacitative, and harm-
based desert approaches to sentencing.258  However, while implicit 
purposes may be better than no purposes at all, they may not 
satisfactorily advance the legitimizing and dialogue-promoting 
objectives of the purposes paradigm.259  Moreover, it is not entirely clear 
how the implicit purposes are to be squared with the substantial 
cooperation benefits of the guidelines and the broad discretion retained 
 
 256. The guidelines themselves do not speak much to the magnitude of departures, but a 
reasonableness standard is suggested by the SRA.  18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3)(C) (2000). 
 257. Miller, supra note 236, at 442. 
 258. See Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And a 
Critique of Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (2004); Hofer & Allenbaugh, 
supra note 185, at 24 (arguing that guidelines reflect “modified just desert” approach, which emphasizes 
desert, with the possibility of enhanced sentences based on dangerousness).  Not all commentators, 
however, would be willing to concede this point.  See, e.g., Block, supra note 164, at 395–96 (criticizing 
Commission for failing to adopt deterrence-based “optimal penalty theory” in favor of more political 
approach); Rappaport, supra note 177, at 1088 (“[T]he Commission pursued political objectives rather 
than undertaking a principled effort to promote the purposes of punishment.”); Mark Osler, Indirect 
Harms and Proportionality: The Upside-Down World of Federal Sentencing, 74 MISS. L.J. 1 (2004) 
(arguing that guidelines perversely impose longer sentences in many contexts for indirect threat of harm 
than for actual harm). 
 259. For a similar argument, see Rappaport, supra note 177, at 1092–95. 
2006] UNIFORMITY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 799 
by prosecutors.  Indeed, if the Commission had tackled these matters—
say, through rigorous, principled regulation of the substantial assistance 
departure—then it might have simultaneously advanced the goals of 
both the purposes and predictability paradigms.  Without such efforts, 
however, it is difficult to take the guidelines seriously as a purpose-
driven sentencing regime.260 
To be fair, Congress gave the first Commission an enormous task to 
accomplish in a limited period of time.  Particularly in light of the 
ideological divisions within the Commission, the gaps and ambiguities 
of the original guidelines may have been a practical necessity in order to 
generate consensus.  Moreover, once the guidelines were promulgated, 
the get-tough politics of the day left the Commission with limited room 
to undertake fundamental reforms.  It is hard to imagine that Congress 
would have tolerated significant increases in judicial discretion or 
decreases in prosecutorial discretion, or a significant reduction in 
aggravating factors or increase in mitigating factors. 
At the same time, this analysis of purposes and predictability may 
help to explain why the federal guidelines system proved so unpopular 
in so many quarters.261  On the one hand, the guidelines did not provide 
the predictability that was of increasing interest to Congress.  On the 
other, the guidelines did not offer the sort of principled, analytical 
 
 260. My criticisms of prosecutorial discretion under the guidelines are elaborated below in Part 
IV.B.  To be sure, there are principled ways of squaring substantial assistance and other cooperation 
benefits with recognized purposes of sentencing.  For instance, based on his analysis of the substantial 
assistance departure and other features of the guidelines, Professor Rappaport has argued that 
utilitarianism is the “best rational reconstruction” of the “implicit logic” of the guidelines.  Aaron J. 
Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 561 (2003).  He thus disagrees with the conclusion of Hofer and 
Allenbaugh that “modified just deserts” provides the best account of the guidelines.  Id. at 609–14; see 
supra note 258 (discussing Hofer and Allenbaugh article).  Rappaport further argues that utilitarianism 
can, in theory, provide adequate legitimacy as a basis for the guidelines system.  Id. at 635–37.  I do not 
disagree that guidelines with cooperation benefits may, in theory, constitute a principled, legitimate 
sentencing system.  I do question whether the guidelines we have can be viewed in this way.  Rappaport 
himself convincingly argues that there are real differences between explicit purposes, which the 
guidelines do not have, and implicit purposes, which he argues they do.  Id. at 559.  Moreover, while I 
do not take a position on the Rappaport-Hofer-Allenbaugh debate, the mere fact that such thoughtful 
commentators have taken such different positions in their “rational reconstructions” of the guidelines’ 
philosophy suggests that the guidelines do not embody either philosophy in an especially clear and 
compelling fashion.  Rappaport himself appropriately couches his argument as a question of which 
philosophy is “plausible,” id. at 561; elsewhere, he, like many other commentators, has argued that the 
guidelines may, as a matter of historical fact, be better viewed as political than principled.  See supra 
note 258. 
 261. See, e.g., TONRY, supra note 10, at 11 (“Few outside the federal commission would disagree 
that the federal guidelines have been a disaster.”).  This unpopularity seems not to be an intrinsic 
characteristic of sentencing commissions and guidelines, as many states have had much happier 
experiences with such reforms.  Id. at 10–11. 
800 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
approach to sentencing that was favored by many academics and 
judges.262 
The Feeney Amendment represented a more decisive embrace of 
predictability.  The attack on departures and judicial discretion 
addressed a notable source of unpredictability in the guidelines system.  
Indeed, the rhetoric surrounding the Amendment made clear that these 
measures were specifically intended to increase deterrence by enhancing 
pre-offense predictability: “[T]he real and immediate prospect of 
significant periods of incarceration is necessary to give force to law.”263  
Though unacknowledged by proponents, of course, this rhetoric was at 
odds with the Amendment’s simultaneous endorsement of cooperation 
benefits.  On the other hand, these aspects of the Amendment may be 
seen as furthering in-system (cooperation-type) predictability. 
Moreover, despite proponents’ frequent invocation of deterrence, the 
Feeney Amendment is most appropriately viewed as a rejection of the 
purposes paradigm.  This paradigm contemplates a deliberative, 
analytical process that makes principled distinctions among offenses and 
offenders, either on a case-by-case basis (as in the Yale group’s 
proposal) or on a category-by-category basis (as the SRA contemplated).  
The Feeney Amendment’s attempt at crude, across-the-board sentence 
increases does not fit the paradigm’s vision.264  The Amendment, in 
short, serves to confirm the rise of predictability and the decline of 
purposes from the time of Kennedy’s early bills. 
 
 262. See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 279 (2005); 
Rappaport, supra note 177, at 1088.  In evaluating its own work, the Commission has employed what 
might be called a negative, minimalist model of uniformity.  More specifically, in its recent “fifteen-year 
report,” the Commission assessed the extent to which the guidelines system has reduced or controlled 
the significance of six variables: (1) prosecutorial charging and plea-bargaining decisions; (2) identity of 
judge; (3) district of prosecution; (4) race; (5) ethnicity; and (6) gender.  U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 140–42 (2004).  While reporting progress in diminishing 
the effect of some of these variables, id., the Commission did not consider whether the guidelines 
system was operating in either a purposeful or a predictable manner.  To be sure, a system that 
minimizes the significance of, say, the identity of the judge is perhaps more likely to be purposeful and 
predictable than one in which the identity of the judge plays an important role.  Yet, such a system need 
not necessarily advance the ends of purpose-driven or predictable sentencing.  For instance, a system 
with draconian mandatory minimums would leave the individual judge with little ability to determine 
the final sentence, but such a system would be far from purposeful. 
 263. Comey, supra note 216. 
 264. To be sure, if the guidelines are viewed as a coherent purpose-driven scheme, and if 
departures are viewed as unprincipled exercises of discretion, then Feeney’s assault on departures might 
plausibly advance the purposes paradigm.  The assumptions, however, are dubious.  The guidelines do 
not purport to be purpose-driven, and their lack of clear principles has been an enduring source of 
criticism.  Meanwhile, there is a body of departure case law that does represent genuinely thoughtful, 
purpose-driven sentencing.  See Berman, supra note 189, at 105.  In the end, there is no good reason to 
believe that departure cases systematically deviate from the purposes paradigm more than within-range 
cases. 
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E.  Booker: A Step Back from Predictability 
We can now return to the conundrum noted at the start of this Article: 
How is it that both the majority and the dissenters in Booker could claim 
to be advancing the cause of uniformity?  Some background to the 
“remedy” question may be helpful.  Prior to Booker, the guidelines 
system was generally understood to rest on fact-finding by the 
sentencing judge, not by a jury.  Thus, all of the real-offense and other 
factors that would go to determine the sentence (other than the elements 
of the offense of conviction) would be found by a judge using the 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
This system was cast into doubt by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, in which the Court held, “Other than the fact of 
a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”265  Apprendi, however, concerned a 
state law that was at least arguably distinguishable from the federal 
guidelines.  In Booker, decided nearly five years later, the Court finally 
held that Apprendi applied to the guidelines, and that the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial thus prohibited judges from increasing 
sentences based on guidelines factors not found by a jury.266 
This “merits” holding set up the remedy problem.267  The four 
dissenters would have implemented the merits holding by requiring that 
juries find aggravating factors under the guidelines.268  The “remedy” 
majority (distinguished from the “merits” majority because it comprised 
a quite different set of Justices) rejected this approach as inconsistent 
with the intent of the SRA.  In order to implement its view of 
congressional intent, the remedy majority excised from the statute 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), which made the guidelines mandatory.269  Left 
behind was Section 3553(a), the provision descended from the Yale 
proposal that required judges to “consider” each of the purposes of 
sentencing (incapacitation, deterrence, desert, and rehabilitation) right 
along with the guidelines on a case-by-case basis.  Thus, in the interest 
of curing a constitutional defect in a way that respected congressional 
intent, Booker ended up making the guidelines advisory in precisely the 
 
 265. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 
 266. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 237–38 (2005). 
 267. The remedy problem required the Court to determine which provisions of the SRA, if any, 
had to be excised in light of the constitutional analysis.  This is a question of legislative intent: “We seek 
to determine what ‘Congress would have intended’ in light of the Court’s constitutional holding.”  Id. at 
246. 
 268. Id. at 272 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); id. at 313 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part). 
 269. Id. at 244 (majority opinion). 
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manner contemplated by the early Kennedy bills. 
How exactly would the dissenters’ remedy violate the SRA’s intent?  
The majority, in an opinion authored by Justice Breyer, equated that 
intent with uniformity, and equated uniformity with “bas[ing] 
punishment upon, the real conduct that underlies the crime of 
conviction.”270  The majority then determined that “to engraft” jury fact-
finding onto the guidelines would “destroy” the real-offense sentencing 
system preferred by Congress.271  For one thing, “[i]t would prevent a 
judge from relying upon a presentence report for factual information, 
relevant to sentencing, uncovered after the trial.”272  More generally, no 
real-offense characteristics could be taken into account “unless 
prosecutors decide to charge more than the elements of the crime.”273  
Thus, “any factor that a prosecutor chose not to charge at the plea 
negotiation would be placed beyond the reach of the judge entirely.”274  
The majority found this to be an unacceptable limitation on the ability of 
the judge to craft an appropriate sentence.  “Prosecutors would . . . 
exercise a power the [SRA] vested in judges: the power to decide, based 
on relevant information about the offense and the offender, which 
defendants merit heavier punishment.”275 
The majority’s version of uniformity hews much more closely to the 
purposes paradigm than to predictability.  The majority’s preference (or, 
to be more precise, the preference imputed by the majority to Congress) 
for a broad consideration of real-offense characteristics is hard to square 
with predictability, especially the majority’s emphasis on information 
acquired after conviction during the presentence investigation.  Indeed, 
the use of such information, and the concomitant rejection of the 
sentencing factors agreed to by prosecutors and defendants pursuant to 
plea bargains, would profoundly undermine what I have referred to as 
in-system (or cooperation-type) predictability. 
Instead of predictability, the majority had in mind a thorough, case-
by-case, judicial determination of which defendants “merit heavier 
punishment.”  Section 3553(a), which becomes the linchpin of the 
sentencing analysis under Booker, provides a purpose-driven framework 
for making the determination.  In short, the Booker remedy turns back 
the clock to the sort of strong-purpose, weak-predictability version of 
uniformity that we saw in the 1970s.  In light of the contrary position 
 
 270. Id. at 250. 
 271. Id. at 252. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 257. 
 275. Id. 
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(weak-purpose, strong-predictability) of the Feeney Amendment 
(enacted less than two years before Booker was decided), it is ironic to 
reach this outcome in the name—of all things—congressional intent! 
By contrast, Justice Stevens, author of the principal remedy dissent, 
seemed untroubled by the impairment of real-offense sentencing.  
Stevens conceded that his remedy “would undoubtedly affect ‘real 
conduct’ sentencing in certain cases,” but, he argued, “such 
sentencing . . . is contrary to the very core of Apprendi.”276  Moreover, 
Stevens asserted, to whatever extent real-offense sentencing would be 
furthered by the majority’s remedy, this would come at the expense of 
predictability: “The majority . . . has eliminated the certainty of 
expectations in the plea process.”277  Stevens felt that this certainty was 
more consistent with congressional intent than real-offense 
sentencing.278  Indeed, underscoring his sense that Congress had rejected 
the purposes approach, Stevens argued that “traditional sentencing goals 
have always played a minor role in the Guidelines system.”279 
In short, the Breyer-Stevens dispute is really a dispute about whether 
the SRA embodied the purposes paradigm or the predictability 
paradigm.280  The majority’s remedy makes little sense from the 
standpoint of predictability, while the dissenters’ remedy (essentially a 
charge-offense system) seems equally at odds with the ideal of purpose-
driven sentencing.  In any event, it should not be surprising that the 
Court splintered on this question of the SRA’s intent, for, as we have 
seen, the SRA represented the culmination of nearly a decade of 
legislative evolution and compromise, and contained considerable 
ambiguity and contradiction.  Indeed, the SRA can be said to have 
embraced both paradigms, without really addressing the tensions 
between them. 
 
 276. Id. at 288 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
 277. Id at 289. 
 278. Id at 296 n.15 (“[T]he Court’s contention that real conduct sentencing was the principal aim 
of the SRA finds no support in the legislative history.”). 
 279. Id. at 297. 
 280. Nor was Booker the first time that the Court confronted the tension between predictability 
and purposes in the federal guidelines system.  In Koon, the Court noted that the guidelines “provide 
uniformity, predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system,” but held that 
Congress had nonetheless intended to preserve some discretion in the system so that every convicted 
person could be considered “as an individual.”  518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (emphasis added).  Justice 
Souter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, particularly emphasized the purposes perspective: 
“[B]oth Congress and the Commission envisioned that departures would require some unusual factual 
circumstance, but would be justified only if the factual difference ‘should’ result in a different sentence.  
Departures, in other words, must be consistent with rational normative order.”  Id. at 115 (Souter, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  I am grateful to Professor Berman for drawing my attention to 
this point. 
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In a sense, then, Breyer and Stevens were both correct (and both 
incomplete) in their characterizations of the SRA’s intent.  To decide 
between the Breyer and Stevens remedies on the basis of Congress’s 
understanding of uniformity in 1984 was bound to result in an 
analytically unsatisfying opinion.  As I have suggested elsewhere, 
Booker might have been more satisfactorily resolved on the basis of a 
deeper analysis of the constitutional values at stake.281 
IV.  UNIFORMITY AND DIGNITY 
The tension between predictability and purposes has become a major, 
if poorly appreciated, source of controversy in the making of federal 
sentencing policy.  Both paradigms can legitimately claim roots in the 
work of Frankel and his contemporaries, and both were ultimately 
embedded in the structure of the SRA.  Our review of the development 
of the uniformity ideal casts the tension between the paradigms in sharp 
relief, and helps to demonstrate the significance of the competing values.  
A comparison between the proposals of the Yale group and the TCF 
Task Force, for instance, offers a nice illustration of how the paradigms 
may lead to quite different means of structuring uniformity. 
An examination of uniformity’s “original intent,” however, also 
suggests that something important has been lost as that intent has been 
translated into law: a concern with the dignity of criminal defendants.  
Treating defendants respectfully was of central importance to Frankel’s 
thinking, in particular.  He viewed predictability and purposes as a 
means to that end.  The two paradigms, however, have come unmoored 
from this original intent, and, aside from occasional, oblique references 
to “fairness,” uniformity is rarely discussed in Congress or the courts in 
terms of respect for defendants.  Instead, uniformity has come to be 
viewed almost wholly as a matter of crime control and respect for public 
views of just punishment. 
This Part assesses the guidelines system through the lens of the 
dignity paradigm, that is, the view that sentencing procedures ought to 
embody respect for the defendant as a member of a national community 
that is committed to ideals of individual liberty and status-equality.  
More specifically, to borrow terminology suggested by Professor Cole, 
my concern is with the “anti-subjugation principle”: due respect for the 
dignity of defendants requires that they not be subjected to the 
“unfettered will of another.”282  While not using this precise 
 
 281. O’Hear, supra note 7, at 253. 
 282. Cole, supra note 8, at 1339–40.  The dignity paradigm may embrace additional procedural 
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terminology, Frankel and his contemporaries were acutely sensitive to 
the anti-subjugation concept, with their concerns focusing on the power 
of judges and parole boards.  Sentencing reform effectively “fettered” 
the will of these actors, but greatly exacerbated a different source of 
subjugation: prosecutorial power.  Booker may help to ameliorate this 
problem, but, as legislative responses to Booker are weighed, experience 
suggests that we should leaven our thinking about uniformity with more 
self-conscious attention to dignitary concerns. 
A.  Dignity as Checks and Balances 
As we have seen, Frankel presented uniformity as a matter of fairness 
to defendants.  In part, his concern was with unduly long sentences, that 
is, with the outcomes of the indeterminate system.  His greater concern, 
however, was with the process.283  The system subjected defendants to 
the unchecked power of another individual, the judge, who might 
exercise that power in malicious or capricious ways.  Frankel 
characterized this power as an affront to the dignity of defendants,284 and 
suggested that it violated fundamental rights of due process and equal 
protection.285  He argued that this degrading process created bitterness 
and anxiety among defendants, and that these feelings impeded 
rehabilitation and exacerbated prison discipline problems.286  These 
themes were consistently echoed by reformers following in Frankel’s 
footsteps, right through the Senate Committee Report that accompanied 
the SRA.287 
It is not surprising that Frankel would emphasize dignity and anti-
subjugation.  As we have seen, the emerging left-liberal critique of the 
rehabilitative ideal centered on concerns over individual liberty and the 
abuse of discretionary power.288  Indeed, these concerns were 
commonplace among informed commentators in the 1960s and 1970s.  
For instance, a 1967 task force of the President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice put it this way: 
 
principles, but anti-subjugation is most pertinent for present purposes.  I will leave further elaboration of 
the dignity paradigm for another day. 
 283. Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, A Conversation About Sentencing Commissions and 
Guidelines, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 655 (1993) (“The idea of a sentencing commission and guidelines 
was not . . . expected in itself to alter our status as the world’s cruelest nation—cruelest in terms of 
incarcerating more people for longer periods than any other country.”). 
 284. FRANKEL, supra note 9, at 11. 
 285. Id. at 103–04. 
 286. Id. at 17, 44. 
 287. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 46 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3229. 
 288. See supra text accompanying notes 32–36. 
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A first tenet of our governmental, religious, and ethical tradition is the 
intrinsic worth of every individual no matter how degenerate.  It is a 
radical departure from that tradition to accept for a defined class of 
persons, even criminals, a regime in which their right to liberty is 
determined by officials wholly unaccountable in the exercise of their 
power . . . .289 
Such views also played an influential role in the constitutional due 
process revolution that occurred alongside the emergence of the 
uniformity ideal in sentencing.290 
Anti-subjugation, of course, has even deeper roots in our national 
legal and political traditions: the concept of checks and balances on 
power plays a central role in our system of government.291  Indeed, the 
act of exposing one person to the arbitrary exercise of power by another 
calls to mind nothing so clearly as slavery.292  Whether or not the power 
is actually exercised in a malevolent fashion, the mere fact that the 
power exists denigrates the personhood of the defendant.293  Even an 
 
 289. The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force 
on Corrections, Task Force Report: Corrections 83 (1967) (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norms 
and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Process, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904, 923 (1962)). 
 290. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (“[S]ociety has a further interest in 
treating the parolee with basic fairness: fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of 
rehabilitation by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness.” (citing President’s Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, supra note 289)). 
 291. See Miller, supra note 204, at 1259 (“The concept of diffusing power in the interests of 
individual liberty and justice is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history.”). 
 292. Antislavery literature before the Civil War commonly criticized the power dynamics of the 
master-slave relationship as intrinsically corrosive of human dignity.  See, e.g., FREDERICK DOUGLASS, 
NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 52 (Signet Books 1968) (1845) (“My mistress 
was . . . a kind and tender-hearted woman; and in the simplicity of her soul she commenced, when I first 
went to live with her, to treat me as she supposed one human being ought to treat another.”; “It was at 
least necessary for her to have some training in the exercise of irresponsible power, to make her equal to 
the task of treating me as though I were a brute.”); DAVID BRION DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN 
PROGRESS 263 (1986) (describing argument that slaveholding inevitably corrupted “morals and 
manners”). 
 293. One may argue that this degradation of criminals is a good, or at least appropriate, response 
to crime.  See WHITMAN, supra note 241, at 21–22 (discussing authors who take this position).  On the 
other hand, there is the risk of what Whitman calls “the intoxication that comes with treating people as 
inferiors,” id. at 23, which may lead to unjustifiable excesses.  Allen similarly criticizes the assumptions 
underlying the view that offenders are properly degraded: “The offender is one outside the pale, and 
members of the in-group . . . are relieved of the ethical restraints governing human relations within 
society.”  ALLEN, supra note 11, at 62–63.  Thus, prominent theorists concerned with the 
communicative content of criminal sanctions have argued against degrading offenders.  See, e.g., R.A. 
Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1186 n.58 (2005).  Likewise, restorative 
justice theorists have argued, on both ethical and crime-control grounds, that society should seek “to 
convey censure without stigma.”  See, e.g., Jim Dignan, Towards a Systematic Model of Restorative 
Justice: Reflections on the Concept, its Context, and the Need for Clear Constraints, in RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 135, 144 (Andrew von 
Hirsch et al. eds., 2003).  For present purposes, I will assume the correctness of this position. 
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exercise of mercy has its pernicious side: mercy expresses status and 
power relationships that do not seem entirely consistent with our ideals 
of democracy and status-equality.294 
Accounts of the sentencing reform movement that neglect dignity and 
anti-subjugation thus miss crucial animating principles.  Perhaps neglect 
stems from the fact that Congress and the Commission have themselves 
paid little attention to these values since 1984.295  This neglect, in turn, 
doubtlessly relates to the more general trend towards harsh punitiveness 
in the American criminal justice system.296  In recent years, 
“[a]rguments pertaining to the inherent dignity or human rights of 
individual offenders have fallen on deaf ears.”297  Perhaps, though, there 
is also an assumption that the subjugation problem has been solved by 
eliminating parole and reducing judicial discretion.  If so, this would be 
a mistaken assumption. 
B.  The Problem of Prosecutorial Power 
Requirements for predictable and/or purpose-driven sentencing may, 
as Frankel envisioned, prove an effective strategy for protecting 
defendants from exposure to the arbitrary exercise of power.  On the 
other hand, a sentencing system designed with predictability and 
purposes in mind need not necessarily advance this protective goal.  In 
particular, the pre-Booker guidelines system illustrates an important 
 
One may also argue there is a certain futility to having a dignified sentencing process, when the 
prison system is so notoriously degrading.  See WHITMAN, supra note 241, at 64–66 (describing 
harshness of American prisons).  After all, the entire judicial process in a criminal case is likely to take 
no more than a few months, while a prison term may last years, or even decades. Yet, if one truly wishes 
more dignified treatment of criminal offenders, there may nonetheless be good reasons to focus on 
sentencing.  Sentencing is a public process, while serving a term of imprisonment is not; the 
circumstances of sentencing may therefore do more to reshape the relations of the defendant with the 
community than the circumstances of imprisonment.  Additionally, a sentencing process that emphasizes 
the humanity and fundamental worth of the defendant may result in more humane outcomes, including 
shorter terms of imprisonment.  Finally, a self-consciously humane and dignified judicial process may 
better highlight the unnecessary degradations of imprisonment, and thereby contribute to public 
attention and reform. 
 294. See WHITMAN, supra note 241, at 12–13 (noting that mercy is traditionally granted by 
superiors to inferiors).  Complementing this view, Professor Markel has also recently argued that mercy 
violates the principle of “equal liberty under law”: “It does this by allowing me (the offender) to 
brandish my unanswered crime as evidence of superiority . . . . [t]he unattractive messages about human 
status attach as long as I receive a penalty less severe than what I would otherwise receive if I were from 
a nonfavored group.”  Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1461 (2004). 
 295. See text accompanying notes 172–74. 
 296. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 305, 308 
(1993). 
 297. Nora V. Demleitner, Is There a Future for Leniency in the U.S. Criminal Justice System?, 
103 MICH. L. REV. 1231, 1257 (2005). 
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pitfall: the effort to bring about greater uniformity may (intentionally or 
otherwise) result not in the reduction of unchecked power, but in the 
simple transfer of such power from judges to prosecutors. 
In the pre-Booker system, particularly as modified by the Feeney 
Amendment, prosecutorial power over sentencing flowed from the 
interplay of three critical policy decisions: the preference for rules over 
standards, the preference for a leveling-up approach to severity, and the 
establishment of substantial, explicit cooperation benefits.  The rules-
based approach diminishes judicial discretion, thereby limiting the 
ability of judges to serve as a counterweight to prosecutors.  The rules-
based approach also creates opportunities for prosecutors to manipulate 
sentences by entering into fact stipulations with defendants and 
otherwise choosing what information to present to the court.  The 
leveling-up approach increases defendants’ sentencing exposure and 
thereby increases prosecutorial plea-bargaining leverage.  Cooperation 
benefits further enhance that leverage. 
Indeed, because sentence severity has grown so great, defendants 
generally have little practical alternative to plea-bargaining: it is only the 
prosecutor who can reliably release the defendant from the harsh rules of 
the guidelines, through substantial assistance, early disposition, and 
super-acceptance motions, as well as generous fact stipulations and 
support for, or at least acquiescence in, non-substantial-assistance 
departures.298  There should be little wonder that the vast majority of 
federal criminal cases in recent years have been resolved by guilty 
pleas.299  In the pre-Booker system, the plea bargain controlled the 
sentence, and the prosecutor controlled the plea bargain.300 
 
 298. See Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 359–69 (2005) (describing various mechanisms used by 
prosecutors under guidelines to induce guilty pleas).  Professor Bibas has recently described more subtle 
“psychological pitfalls” under the guidelines that serve to enhance prosecutorial plea-bargaining 
leverage.  For instance, certainty in prison terms under the guidelines may cause a defendant to 
“reframe” a plea bargain containing a short prison term as a gain rather than a loss, and hence view the 
bargain in more favorable terms.  Bibas, supra note 160, at 2514–15. 
 299. In 2002, for instance, eighty-nine percent of federal defendants were convicted, and ninety-
six percent of these convictions were obtained by plea.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2002, at 1 (2005). 
 300. See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548, 2558–60 (2004) (arguing that prosecutors can usually “dictate the terms of 
plea bargains”).  The question of how prosecutors have been able to accumulate such power has 
generated a provocative body of literature.  See, e.g., Huigens, supra note 248, at 818 (arguing that 
expanded prosecutorial discretion arises from need for someone in system designed around 
consequentialist principles to have ability to make context-specific moral judgments); William J. Stuntz, 
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529–33 (2001) (arguing that 
prosecutorial discretion arises from public choice pathologies favoring harsh, symbolic criminal 
legislation). 
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Can prosecutors be trusted with this power?  It is certainly not the 
case that prosecutors inevitably use their power to seek the harshest 
punishment available.  Indeed, prosecutors have frequently colluded 
with district court judges to mitigate sentences where the guidelines 
would otherwise require what they believe to be unreasonably severe 
outcomes.301  On the other hand, there is no reason to believe that 
prosecutors are systematically any more rational, principled, or selfless 
than judges or other public servants.302  The Sentencing Commission 
itself identifies prosecutors as a notable source of unwarranted disparity 
under the guidelines.303  Of even greater concern are indications that 
prosecutors have been using their extraordinary power to extract guilty 
pleas from defendants who likely would have been acquitted had they 
gone to trial.304  Moreover, as suggested in the previous section, the 
mere fact that prosecutors have such profound discretionary power over 
defendants, without regard to the wisdom or mercy with which that 
power is exercised, places defendants in a degrading position.305 
To be sure, the pre-Booker system contemplated some limitations on 
prosecutorial power.  The guidelines themselves call for real-offense 
sentencing, which diminishes the importance of the prosecutor’s 
charging decisions; judicial review of plea bargains; and judicial 
determination of the magnitude of departures.  Moreover, pursuant to the 
Feeney Amendment, DOJ adopted new policies that purported to 
diminish the discretion of line prosecutors, particularly with respect to 
plea-bargaining. 
None of these features, however, provide effective checks on 
prosecutorial power.  Judges face powerful institutional incentives 
 
 301. TONRY, supra note 10, at 83. 
 302. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 160, at 2470–75 (describing effects of self-interest on 
prosecutorial plea-bargaining strategies).  There is an extensive body of literature, much of it critical, 
exploring the motives of prosecutors.  See Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: 
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (discussing 
literature).  Professor Burke suggests an alternative view of “irrational” prosecutorial decisions, finding 
their roots in basic cognitive biases that are common to all human decisionmaking.  Id. 
 303. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 262, at 141. 
 304. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal 
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79 (2005) (suggesting link between long-term trends of rising guilty plea 
rates and declining acquittal rates); GARY T. LOWENTHAL, DOWN AND DIRTY JUSTICE 105–06 (2003) 
(describing pressures on defendants to plea bargain even when they believe they have a good chance of 
acquittal at trial). 
 305. The position is perhaps most vividly illustrated by the unseemly “race to cooperate” in 
multidefendant cases, in which prosecutors often announce that they will give substantial assistance 
benefits only to the first one or two defendants in the group who “flip.”  Bibas, supra note 160, at 2485.  
“Rats,” of course, suffer ostracization and stigmatization, Simons, supra note 18, at 26–27, but 
defendants may feel they have little choice but to try to win the race.  Prosecutors reserve for themselves 
the right to decide who gets cooperation benefits and how much.  Id. at 18–19. 
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against overriding plea bargains, such as crowded trial dockets, and they 
have proven quite reluctant to do so.306  Formal DOJ policies are not 
externally enforceable, while internal controls are uncertain in a system 
in which the ninety-four individual USAOs have traditionally operated 
as “autonomous fiefdoms.”307  Thus, a recent empirical study concluded 
that “the prosecutorial discretion of individual [line prosecutors] is quite 
broad and appears to operate largely independent of any formal review 
mechanisms.”308  Moreover, even if taken at face value, the post-Feeney 
DOJ policies leave in place broad prosecutorial discretion as to 
cooperation benefits.309 
To be sure, prosecutors occupy a different position in our 
constitutional system than judges, and one might argue that political 
accountability compensates for the lack of legal control over 
prosecutorial discretion.  Political control, however, is more theoretical 
than real.  The vast majority of routine exercises of federal prosecutorial 
discretion occur well below the public’s radar screen.310  Federal 
prosecutors have a strong tradition of viewing themselves as 
independent professionals,311 a cultural norm that is complemented by 
the highly decentralized structure of DOJ.  Political pressures, in short, 
 
 306. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 209, at 1301; Gardina, supra note 298, at 369. 
 307. JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE 
NATION’S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES 14 (1996).  See also Daniel C. Richman & 
William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Article on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 613 (2005) (“Field offices preserve their independence by leveraging their 
connections to local officials and by playing off supervision by Main Justice against oversight by 
Congress.”).  For a discussion of a case in which line prosecutors apparently disregarded the Ashcroft 
Memoranda, see Dan Christensen, Florida Judge Complains U.S. Prosecutor Is ‘Weak-Kneed,’ MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV., Mar. 18, 2004, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1079144426509. 
 308. Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An Empirical 
Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 AM.CRIM. L. REV. 1439, 1497 (2004).  See also Schulhofer & Nagel, 
supra note 209, at 1295 (discussing lack of supervisory review in most USAOs studied). 
 309. The Ashcroft Memoranda specifically exempt early disposition programs and substantial 
assistance departures from the mandate to pursue all readily provable charges.  Ashcroft, supra note 226, 
at 130–31.  Of course, there is also discretion inherent in the determination of what is “readily 
provable.”  See Miller, supra note 204, at 1257 (“[T]he tough-sounding 2003 policies include exceptions 
that any wise prosecutor . . . could drive a truck through.”). 
 310. In 2002, federal prosecutors investigated nearly 125,000 suspects, charged more than 85,000, 
and convicted more than 70,000.  FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, supra note 299, at 1.  In a 
sense, these numbers are both too high and too low to provide for meaningful accountability.  They are 
too high to permit case-by-case monitoring in any but a tiny fraction of highly publicized prosecutions, 
such as the Martha Stewart case.  They are too low for the public to hold federal prosecutors broadly 
accountable for crime control.  That sort of accountability is reserved for the local police and 
prosecutors who handle the vast majority of criminal cases.  Richman & Stuntz, supra note 307, at 609, 
611.  Richman and Stuntz observe that federal prosecutors face no “meaningful performance measures.”  
Id. at 613. 
 311. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 209, at 1297–98.  See Christensen, supra note 307 (quoting 
U.S. Attorney as claiming, “We do what is right in every case, regardless of the opinion of others.”). 
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are unlikely to offer a robust check on prosecutorial power.312  In the 
end, there seems little to choose between the prospect of arbitrary 
judicial action decried by Frankel and the prospect of arbitrary 
prosecutorial action under the pre-Booker system.313 
C.  Booker and Dignity 
Booker has strengthened the ability of the judge to function as a check 
on prosecutorial power.314  By reinvigorating the purpose-based 
mandates to judges contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), Booker has made 
the federal sentencing system a bit less rules-based.  With greater 
judicial discretion, prosecutors are no longer the only game in town for 
defendants seeking lenience.  Indeed, judges now arguably have the 
authority to adjust sentences specifically in order to address charging 
and plea-bargaining disparities.315 
 
 312. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 397 (2001).  See also Richman & Stuntz, supra note 307, at 587 
(“[P]olitical constraints that rein in local prosecutors are much weaker in the federal system.”). 
 313. Recall, for instance, that the parole board functioned as a check on judicial discretion in the 
indeterminate era, with the ability to release inmates after they had served as little as one-third of their 
sentences.  Notably, many years after the Guidelines had been put into place, Frankel characterized the 
original intent this way: “The genesis of the commission and the guidelines was a basic aversion to 
placing arbitrary power in the hands of any officials, including judges.”  Frankel & Orland, supra note 
283, at 655 (emphasis added).  See also id. at 671 (noting that “the goal of eliminating arbitrary disparity 
remains worthwhile and that undue prosecutorial discretion subverts the goal”).  Other influential critics 
of judicial discretion writing about the time as Frankel equally emphasized their concern with 
prosecutorial discretion.  See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 58, at 211–12 (“The reasons for a judicial check of 
prosecutors’ discretion are stronger than for such a check of other administrative discretion that is now 
traditionally reviewable.” (emphasis in original)); BACON ET AL., supra note 26, at 138 (“Prosecutors 
have immense discretionary power to coerce guilty pleas.”).  Indeed, as part of a broader program to 
reduce discretionary power in the criminal justice system, the AFSC Report advocated the abolition of 
plea-bargaining.  Id. at 143–44. 
While the critique of unchecked prosecutorial power suggested here does not depend on the power 
actually being abused, it should be noted that formal complaints of prosecutorial misconduct have 
increased substantially in recent years.  Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus 
of the Misbehaving Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 45, 46 (2005). 
 314. This is not to suggest that the Booker remedy is the only or the best solution to the problem 
of prosecutorial power.  There is a rich literature, for instance, discussing the strengths and weaknesses 
of formal prosecutorial guidelines, which might or might not be made judicially enforceable.  See, e.g., 
Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1010 (2005); O’Neill, supra note 308, at 1494–97.  For an argument that judicial 
discretion is the best way to counterbalance prosecutorial discretion, see Jeffrey Standen, Plea 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1476 (1993). 
 315. See Michael M. O’Hear, Booker and the Duty to Minimize Unwarranted Disparity, 36 
MCGEORGE L. REV. (2006) (forthcoming) (discussing post-Booker use of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (6) as a 
basis for mitigating both interdistrict disparities in plea-bargaining practices and the sentencing effects 
of a decision to bring federal charges as to conduct that also constitutes a state crime).  Under 18 U.S.C. 
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To the extent that the Booker remedy seems to advance dignitary 
interests of criminal defendants, this is something of a coincidence, for, 
as we have seen, such interests do not weigh prominently in Justice 
Breyer’s opinion for the remedy majority.  On the other hand, the 
opinion of the merits majority (without which there would have been no 
remedy) resonates in powerful and unexpected ways with the work of 
Frankel and his contemporaries. 
Writing for this majority, Justice Stevens emphasized the protection 
of individuals from arbitrary exercises of power.  His professed aim was 
to “guarantee[] that the jury would still stand between the individual and 
the power of government.”316  “The Framers of the Constitution,” he 
argued, “understood the threat of ‘judicial despotism’ that could arise 
from ‘arbitrary punishments upon arbitrary convictions’ without the 
benefit of a jury in criminal cases.”317  Thus, he concluded, the Sixth 
Amendment demanded that government accusations against a defendant 
be submitted “to the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and 
neighbors, rather than a lone employee of the State.”318  The merits 
opinion is thus couched as a blow against the despotism of the “lone 
employee” (the judge) and in favor of the values of equality and 
democracy represented by the jury.319 
The irony is that most commentators saw the prosecutor, not the 
judge, as the “lone employee” most capable of despotism in the pre-
Booker system.320  Indeed, the remedy majority displayed considerably 
more concern over unchecked prosecutorial power than did the merits 
majority—albeit not as a matter of defendants’ rights, but as a matter of 
preserving real-offense sentencing.321  Thus, one of the few points on 
which all of the justices agreed was that unchecked power in the 
sentencing system should be avoided; the justices divided on the 
question of whose power was most troublesome and why that power 
 
§ 3553(a)(6) (2000), judges are required to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities” when determining a sentence. 
 316. 543 U.S. 220, 237 (2005). 
 317. Id. at 238–39 (citation omitted). 
 318. Id. at 239 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 319. For similar views of jury sentencing as a democratic check on other government institutions, 
see Gardina, supra note 298, at 347; Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Implementing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 106, 111 (2004). 
 320. See, e.g., MCGEE & DUFFY, supra note 307, at 9 (“The nation’s founders had vivid memories 
of life under a tyrannical monarch . . . . [T]he framers of the Constitution could not have imagined—or 
allowed for—an institution as powerful as today’s Department of Justice.”); Miller, supra note 204, at 
1268 (arguing that guidelines system gave prosecutors power “more absolute than [judges had in] the 
indeterminate system that came before”). 
 321. See, e.g., 543 U.S. at 256 (“[The dissenters’] system would have particularly troubling 
consequences with respect to prosecutorial power.”). 
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should be regarded as a problem. 
D.  Responses to Booker 
While the analysis in Booker seems oddly misdirected in a number of 
respects, we ought to welcome the Court’s implicit invitation that we 
refocus our attention on power relationships in the sentencing system.322  
This marks a return to where the sentencing reform movement began 
three decades ago.  The concerns raised by Frankel and his 
contemporaries then seem no less relevant today.  Thus, as Congress, the 
Commission, and the lower courts formulate responses to Booker, they 
would do well to bear in mind Booker’s critique of unchecked power.  
Predictability and purpose-driven sentencing, while worthy ends, should 
not be the sole preoccupations of the federal sentencing system. 
Indeed, in a world in which there is a strong rhetorical commitment to 
uniformity, but with unresolved and unacknowledged points of tension 
between the purposes and predictability paradigms, there is a risk that 
policy-makers may engage in a sort of triangulation between the 
paradigms in order to advance agendas that are not fully revealed or 
well-considered.  This risk is exacerbated by what Professor Allen 
referred to as the tendency towards debasement in the criminal justice 
system, that is, the tendency towards the misuse of high ideals as 
camouflage for practices that are arbitrary, self-serving, or cruel.323  
While Allen illustrated the debasement concept specifically by reference 
to abuses committed by prison officials in the name of the rehabilitative 
ideal, there seems no reason why the uniformity ideal could not be 
similarly debased, for instance, through the abuse of prosecutorial 
power.324 
 
 322. Professor Gardina, however, finds Booker less heartening in this regard; she argues that “the 
Court simply transferred unchecked power from the hands of the prosecutor to the hands of the federal 
bench.”  Gardina, supra note 298, at 349.  I think she overstates this point.  Only time will tell, of 
course, what the judiciary will make of its enhanced discretion, but there are persuasive reasons for 
viewing the Booker remedy as potentially quite different from the truly unchecked system that Frankel 
criticized.  See 543 U.S. at 264 (arguing that requirement that guidelines be taken into account under 
Booker, as well as ongoing availability of appellate review of sentences, “continue to move sentencing 
in Congress’ preferred direction”). 
 323. ALLEN, supra note 11, at 51–54. 
 324. Echoing some of Allen’s observations, Professor Whitman has recently written much about 
the tendency of punishment practices to unleash punitive emotions that “spin out of control” into 
vengefulness and degradation.  See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2698, 2701, 2716–17 (2005).  In light of such concerns, a sentencing system, like the pre-Booker 
system, that effectively turns prosecutors into punishers demands especially close scrutiny of the 
prosecutorial role and consideration of whether that role can be structured so as to ensure “a 
dispassionate professional attitude.”  Id. at 2723–24. 
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The triangulation problem is nicely demonstrated by recent, much-
publicized remarks of Attorney General Gonzales in support of new 
legislation that would largely undo Booker.325  Gonzales specifically 
argued that the mandatory nature of the guidelines should be restored 
with respect to the bottom of guidelines ranges, while judges should be 
allowed to retain their broadened post-Booker authority to sentence 
above the top of such ranges.326  This would shift the balance of 
sentencing power back in the direction of prosecutors.  In defense of this 
position, Gonzales discussed both judicial and prosecutorial discretion, 
but in remarkably asymmetric ways. 
As to judicial discretion, Gonzales expressed concern with its effects 
on the “careful balancing” embodied by the guidelines.327  Gonzales 
depicted the guidelines in glowing terms as a purpose-driven system 
designed to achieve just deserts, incapacitation, and deterrence.328  In 
particular, the guidelines were lauded because they “require[d] serious 
sentences for serious offenders.”329  Moreover, the guidelines had 
“evolved over time to adapt to changing circumstances and a better 
understanding of societal problems and the criminal justice system.  
Judges, legislators, the Sentencing Commission, prosecutors, defense 
lawyers, and others have worked hard to develop a system of sentencing 
guidelines that has protected Americans and improved American 
justice.”330  The guidelines ranges were, in short, “carefully 
considered;”331 rendering them merely advisory threatened to undermine 
“decades of wisdom and experience.”332  Indeed, since Booker, Gonzales 
claimed, defendants have been “receiving sentences dramatically lower 
than the guidelines range without any explanation.”333  Judicial 
 
 325. Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen., Remarks at the National Center for Victims of Crime, 
Washington, D.C., June 21, 2005. 
 326. Id. at 8–9.  Such a reform would at least arguably be consistent with Apprendi and its 
progeny because the Court has approved of the use of judicial fact-finding in determining mandatory 
minimum sentences.  Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).  For a discussion of other proposals 
intended to reconcile mandatory guidelines with the Apprendi rule, see Steven L. Chanenson, The Next 
Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 408–32 (2005). 
 327. Gonzales, supra note 325, at 2. 
 328. Id. at 4. 
 329. Id. at 3. 
 330. Id. at 5. 
 331. Id. at 3. 
 332. Id. at 9. 
 333. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).  Sentencing Commission data indicate that the rate of within-range 
sentences has fallen post-Booker: in the first half-year after the decision, 61.7% of sentences were 
within-range, as opposed to 65.0% in FY 2002 and 69.4% in FY 2003.  U.S. Sentencing Commission, 
Special Post-Booker Coding Project 8 (July 14, 2005).  However, the rate of above-range sentences 
more than doubled, representing a much larger increase than below-range sentences.  Id.  Overall, 
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discretion must be curtailed, Gonzalez argued, in the name of coherent, 
purpose-driven sentencing. 
With respect to prosecutorial discretion, however, Gonzales shifted 
emphasis from the purposes paradigm to the predictability paradigm, 
specifically cooperation-type predictability.  He complained: 
[O]ur U.S. Attorneys consistently report that a critical law enforcement 
tool has been taken from them.  Under the sentencing guidelines, 
defendants were only eligible to receive reductions in sentences in 
exchange for cooperation when the government petitioned the court.  
Under the advisory guidelines system, judges are free to reduce sentences 
when they believe the defendant has sufficiently cooperated.  And since 
defendants no longer face penalties that are serious and certain, key 
witnesses are increasingly less inclined to cooperate with prosecutors.334 
He thus treats as wholly unproblematic a necessary consequence of 
cooperation benefits: a disruption of the purpose-driven system he 
elsewhere praised for ensuring “serious sentences for serious 
offenders.”335  When the subject is judicial discretion, the guidelines 
ranges embody “decades of wisdom and experience”; when the subject 
is prosecutorial discretion, the guidelines are only significant as a 
baseline from which prosecutors and defendants can negotiate. 
There is something of a shell game here, which is made possible by 
fuzzy thinking about the significance of the guidelines and the nature of 
uniformity.  The Gonzales proposal reflects an unacknowledged set of 
trade-offs—incapacitation, deterrence, and harm-based desert ought to 
control sentences, he is saying, except when a prosecutor decides 
otherwise in order to induce cooperation—and these trade-offs have the 
effect (also unacknowledged) of endowing prosecutors with a 
tremendous amount of discretionary authority over defendants.  This 
may or may not be good policy, but debate over the proposal can and 
should be enriched with a Frankel-like attention to the risks of the abuse 
of power and the degradation of defendants. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In important early formulations, the uniformity ideal combined both 
rationalizing and humanizing objectives.  By bringing an expert 
commission to bear, reformers sought to introduce a new analytical rigor 
to the sentencing process.  They hoped that outcomes would thereby 
 
average sentence length increased from fifty-two months to fifty-five months.  Id. at 44. 
 334. Gonzales, supra note 325, at 6. 
 335. Id. at 3. 
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better reflect traditional purposes of punishment.  But they also hoped 
that sentences would simultaneously become more meaningful, and 
hence more tolerable, for defendants.  Reformers expected that greater 
predictability in outcomes would also make the process more humane. 
Over time, however, predictability was seen less as a benefit for 
defendants, and more as a big stick to deter crime and encourage 
cooperation.  Indeed, by the time of the Feeney Amendment, this 
became the dominant account of uniformity in the political system.  
Booker, however, has forced a reexamination of the uniformity ideal and 
offered a new opportunity for purpose-driven sentencing.  Booker has 
also suggested a new framework for thinking about the dignitary 
interests of defendants, one that is grounded in constitutional jury trial 
rights.  Thus, we stand at a moment in time from which the uniformity 
ideal might continue its thirty-year evolution in a number of different 
directions. 
Instead of reconstituting the uniformity ideal, though, perhaps we 
ought to reject it altogether.  Has uniformity run its course?  Is it time to 
seek out new organizing principles for the federal sentencing system?  I 
leave answers for these questions to a forthcoming project, but I will 
close with two pertinent observations arising from the historical analysis 
in Part II above.  First, while rhetorical commitment to uniformity 
remains strong at the federal level, state criminal justice systems—which 
are collectively far more important than federal, at least measured by 
size336—have increasingly turned away from uniform sentencing in 
recent years and towards experiments with radically individualized 
responses to crime, represented by restorative justice programs and 
therapeutic courts.337  This trend is particularly notable in light of the 
fact that, in the 1970s, the states, not the federal government, led the 
way in rejecting the rehabilitative ideal and experimenting with 
uniformity schemes like sentencing guidelines.338 
Second, some of the same criticisms that were made of the 
rehabilitative ideal in the 1970s might be made of the uniformity ideal 
today.  In particular, a central tenet of the left-liberal critique of 
 
 336. For instance, in 2002, state courts convicted more than one million adults of a felony, while 
federal courts convicted about 63,000.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2002, at 1 (2004). 
 337. For a discussion of the therapeutic jurisprudence movement, see O’Hear, supra note 202, at 
823–25.  For an overview and evaluation of restorative justice programs in the United States and abroad, 
see Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the 21st Century: A Social Movement Full of 
Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2006).  For a discussion of the tension between 
uniformity and restorative justice, see Michael M. O’Hear, Is Restorative Justice Compatible With 
Sentencing Uniformity?, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 305 (2006) (forthcoming). 
 338. See supra note 124. 
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rehabilitation was its indeterminacy—no one could really say what 
rehabilitation meant or how to accomplish it—and its resulting 
susceptibility to debasement, particularly misuse as cover for crude 
punitiveness.339  Likewise, the uniformity ideal lacks determinacy; there 
has not been a stable consensus over what types of disparity are truly 
unwarranted (other than racial disparity and a small number of similar 
categories) or how best to root out the disparities we want to get rid of 
(e.g., how strong should the “rule-ness” of guidelines be?).  As for 
debasement, it is hard not to see crude punitiveness in the dramatic, 
unprecedented growth in national incarceration rates that has occurred in 
the uniformity era.340 
 
 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
 340. As of the end of 2003, one in every 140 residents of the United States was incarcerated.  
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2003, at 2 (2004).  In the federal 
system, annual increases in the incarcerated population averaged nearly eight percent between 1995 and 
2003.  Id. 
